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"My brothers, you are ignorant of the r~sons which have induced me to act,
although I have spared no pains to keep you infonned ofmy sentiments."l So stated
Ohwandiyag, who was called in the English tongue simply Pontiac, regarding the nature
of his activities in the years 1760-1769. Though he was addressing his French allies, the
Ottawa chief might as well have directed the same thought at historians who attempt to
characterize his actions within the context of European warfare or limit his leadership to
the confines of his own place and people. The role of Pontiac still waits to be analyzed
apart from a context that reduces the Indians of the Great Lakes region to mere objects
upon whom the European powers acted-much like the forests, mountains, and other
physical obstacles encountered in the New World. Despite the presuppositions of many
scholars of early America, Indian civilizations were not in decline. Neither were the
Native Americans passive or purely reactive amid the waning days of the Seven Years'
War between France and England (1756-1763). Rather, the peoples of the Old Northwest
comprised a distinct third party in the political affairs of the era and Pontiac became their
most articulate and forceful leader.
Scholarship on the role ofPontiac diminishes his significance by focusing too
strictly upon the territorial aspects ofEuro-lndian disputes while failing to put into proper
context the cultural dynamics at work. Modern scholars invariably react to the work of
the nineteenth-century historian, Francis Parkman, and his account of the events relating
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to the Ottawa chief Parkman's interpretations are permeated with an obvious celebration
of Manifest Destiny as it swept across North America and over its Native inhabitants.
The Indians appear as degenerat.e souls resisting the righteous advance of a superior
European culture with Pontiac being elevated to a sort of archetype for Native opposition,
Tinged with racial assumptions, Parkman asserts that the Indians' "susceptibility... to
superstitious impressions" produced recurring calls for spiritual revival, which really
served as a fayade for simple resistance. 2 With this dynamic being hardly unique among
American Indians, in Parkman's opinion, genuine cultural considerations are dismissed as
the embodiment of little more than Indian grievance, coupled to their primitive nature,
then channeled by a charismatic leader, in this case Pontiac. According to this
assessment, it was this war chief who fostered a grand conspiracy against white colonists.
Within his own portrayal of a cultural clash which considers only its violent aspects,
Parkman is rightfully accused of making Pontiac more prominent than those facts offered
can sustain, as well as presenting an interpretation steeped in the outmoded "great man"
theory ofhistory..J
Howard H. Peckham attempted to rectify the dated aspects of Parkman's work.
Most scholars view Peckham's piece as a more accurate analysis of the social climate
around the Gr,eat Lakes as he contends that the clashes between Engl ish and Indian
peoples resulted from Native grievances following the arrogant, if not abusive, practices
of British authorities. While Pontiac was an important leader, he was merely one of
many regional chiefs disputing the English presence in a particular tribe's given territory.
But Peckham, like Parkman, downplays the cultural basis ofPontiac's ascension,
specifically the pan-tribal nature of Indian activities during this period. Peckham
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contends that Pontiac only '~shrewdly recognized the power" of the religious and cuttural
trends among the tribes of the region. 4 The Indians' dire economic situation was ready to
produce an explosion ofviolence across the Old Northwest; thus, in Peckham's account
Pontiac's actions are more the outgrowth of such instability in temporal affairs than the
expression of any internal cultural dynamic..5
Thematic variations grew out ofPeckbam's interpretation with historians
emphasizing those selected aspects of the struggle they deemed most important. These
historians have drawn out the regional nature ofEuro-Indian conflicts, elevating the
significance of events and trends above those figures associated with them, including
Pontiac. Wilbur R Jacobs focuses upon the practice ofgift giving between the
Europeans and Indians maintaining that these "'presents' [were] soothing medicine [that]
tended to cause dissatisfied warriors to forget their grievances.,,6 He views Pontiac as a
leader who manipulated Indian outrage after British officials ended the practice of gift
giving at the close of the Seven Years' War. Anthony F. C. WaIlace stresses the
"revitalization" of Indian religion in their attempt to retain some semblance of custom
and culture. He argues specifically that a "syncretism"? between Christian and Indian
myth comprised an effort to explain why the economic circumstances of indian peoples
were becoming so desperate. Thus the answer to their plight was found in a return to
traditional ways. This was one of many disparate "nativist" movements lacking in any
real continuity, thus Wallace continues to restrict Pontiac to the narrow confines of his
own place and people. Finally, Richard White constructs a shared trade culture, a
"middle ground," between Indians and Europeans. This middle ground served to
facilitate communication and maintain peace. The absence of the French following their
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capitulation of land to England threatened their advantageous location on the physical
and interpersonal middle ground between the competing European nations. So, the
Indians rebelled in an effort to keep the British leadership within the confines of the
shared trade culture. Taken as a historiographic whole, this recent scholarship on the role
of Pontiac has replaced the "great man" theory \?fhistory with determinism, contending
that forces greater than any of the people involved were moving to a crit.icai point.
Pontiac was merely historically fortunate in that scholars recorded his name, but even
then he should only be discussed in a narrowly-defined tribal and territorial context.8
Some historians have recently begun to reconsider aspects of these interpretations
and chaIlenge the decidedly English slant that characterizes existing literature on
Pontiac's activities. Carl A. Brasseaux and Michael 1. Leblanc focus their interpretation
upon material relating to the leadership of New France. Pontiac becomes a critical
component in an aborted French attempt to engage their English adversaries in concert
with those Indians residing in America's northern and southern regions. French
assurances of joint military engagements, supplies, and reinforcements prompted Pontiac
to begin assaults on British installations in the north, thus the Ottawa chiefs actions are
seen as the product of French strategic ambitions. Conversely, Gregory E. Dowd offers
an interpretation of the Indian wars as an attempt on the part of Pontiac to manipu~ate the
leadership of New France in the Louisiana Territory. Playing off the concerns of the
habitants-French coloniaJ.s-who were made British subjects as a result of the surrender
of France's Canadian assets in Quebec, Pontiac aroused anti-British sentiment among all
of the inhabitants of the Great Lakes region spreading rumors that the French king's
return was imminent. In truth, French leaders never desired to once again preside over
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expressions that made sense when put into the context of an evolving association with
their European counterparts. As events shifted, the players jockeyed for strong
negotiating positions, and Pontiac alone managed to keep himself in the critical center of
the balance of power between the Algonquins, the French, and the British. His efforts
and importance are then best understood after seeing how he interacted with fellow
Indians in the afterglow of a prophetic vision, what internalized cultural assumptions he
utilized in negotiations with his own people or to others, and the evolution of his
continuous association with the duplicitous English and more trustworthy French. With
each of these points considered, it is evident that Pontiac used culturally-valid means to
become a true Indian leader always aware of what choices would assure the most
beneficial results for Native peoples. In so dOIng, Pontiac's leadership stands as the very
embodiment of the hopes of Native peoples unified in their purpose to remain upon a
land coveted by European powers vying for empire.
The methodology employed in this work is rooted in ethnohistory. Existing
interpretations are limited in their research design by the exclusive use of documentary
evidence. Increasingly diaries, letters, and other recorded personal observations from
participants and witnesses involved in historical events are being incorporated to provide
a wider perspective on events. Biases are inherent in works of this kind so care was taken
to sift out subjective opinion from objective fact. Jt is my intention that through
incorporating these perspectives a more complete understanding ofhistorical events will
result. But in an effort to compensate for inherent biases in subjective perspectives, care
was taken to corroborate accounts, juxtapose the assessments ofvarious witnesses to
construct an accurate interpretation, and use them in conjunction with existing documents
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to square perceptions with reality. Anthropological infonnation about Indian societies is
also used in this analysis. Such data, lacking in most ofthe existing.interpretations of
Pontiac's activities, explains the dynamics of those Native American cultures which
formerly existed in the historiography only as a part of the backdrop upon which
Europeans acted. By employing research on ho.w and why Indian societies functioned as
they did, a sort of historical subconscious of a people is constructed to serve as a means
of explaining the process and legitimacy ofPontiac's ascension and activities, thus
allowing a more accurate assessment and characterization ofNative cultures. In short, an
ethnohistorical approach explains the social and political interrelationship between the
Europeans and Indians throughout the Northwest in a more complete manner without
lapsing into a "frontier/white" or a "revisionist/red" bias.
The structure of this work consciously follows its title. After exploring the goals
of the parties involved-French., English, and Indian-the focus is placed on the spiritual
foundation of Pontiac's ascension. Pontiac served as a "bridegroom" who married his
personal fortunes to the vision of the Lenape prophet, Neolin, in 1762. There is no
reason to discount the sincerity of the prophet's spiritual message. Indian theological
trends that preceded Pontiac were just as complex in their development and sincere in
their expression as Christian beliefs were among the Europeans of this era. Regardless of
whether a prophet's vision was real, the people who believe him gauge their actions as
though the revelation was genuine, thus perception becomes just as influential as reality.
These new religious dynamics owed little to the influence of Christian myth as spread
throughout the region by missionaries; rather the rituals of the various denominations
adopted by the Indians served to facilitate the dissemination and comprehension of
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Neolin's message. The vision thereby undercut all of the existing circumstances that kept
the Native peoples apart: missionary influence, tribal allegiance, and alliances with
European powers. The vision also afford Pontiac the opportunity to hold sway beyond
the range of his own people and region, giving him cross-culturaJ legitimacy provided he
demonstrated a capacity to conduct negotiations that produced tangible benefits between
Indian converts and the European nations struggling for empire on Native land.
Many of the socio-economic aspects of Euro-Indian relations, which are often
collectively referred to as grievances, are the focus of the second phase ofthis work.
Through consideration of the culturally-based perceptions of the Europeans and Indians, I
will show that Pontiac's activities amounted to much more than the simple expression of
an aggrieved people. Genuine misunderstandings occurred between the parties involved,
particularly English.and Indian leaders. Focusing specifically on the themes of trade and
settlement, I will show that Pontiac emerged as a collective mediator for the Great Lakes
tribes. As the various peoples m~xed in the west, collecting like beads for an Algonquin
"war belt," the Ottawa chief adeptly used the language of religion to stitch together a
coalition of tribes united in purpose. Pontiac demonstrated the ability to stoke or quell
hostilities among his ever-increasing number of followers. As he articulated Indian
concerns to his European counterparts, the activities of French and English officials only
exacerbated problems by fostering arrogance among policy makers, increasing fear
among European settlers, and creating an aggressive unity among the Indians. Pontiac
maintained his personal centrality during this tenuous period, though cooled relations
with the French and heated relations with the British slowly eroded the meager common
cultural ground he placed himself upon in his effort to speak on behalfofa Native
coalition addressing European arrogance.
The third section as well as the conclusion of this work looks at Pontiac's failed
efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the lingering British menace and maintain peace
among the Indians and Europeans, culminating ~n his agreement to try France's "hatchet"
upon the English. The Ottawa chief demonstrated his capacity to keep negotiating
channels open despite constant cultural slights on the part of European officials. Ably
playing both the British and French ofT one another to the Indians' advantage, Pontiac
brought the parties to the brink of a peaceful resolution by means of shared cultural
understanding and mutual benefit. But the Europeans resolved their own disputes in the
Peace of Paris (1763) ending the Seven Years' War. The subsequent hostility of
Europeans toward the Indians choked ofTall efforts to speak of peace between the
victorious British and those Indians formerly aHied with the French. In the wake of
military engagements that stalled at Fort Detroit and Fort Pitt, Pontiac was reduced to a
regional role. As he deviated from the common vision that united his foHowers, many
tribes sued for a separate peace with the English to forestall any long-term difficulties.
For his part, Pontiac continued to prolong the Anglo-Indian war on a smaller scale as he
intermittently attacked and negotiated with English representatives. His significance can
thus be seen in the absence ofa stable social environment throughout the region until the
year of his murder, 1769.
A closing note needs mention on the use of terms. Staying consistent with the
desire to show Native Americans as active participants in the affairs of early America,
every effort was made to forego the use of words containing the prefix '"re-" as are
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commonly used in existing interpretations such as "rebellion," "revitalization," and so on
because they demonstrate Indian activities existing secondarily, if not subordinate, to the
"real" concerns of European powers. Likewise, the classification "Pontiac's War" is
avoided outside of the narrow confines of the physical clash. Pontiac's warfare
comprises only one aspect of his role in Euro-Indian relations. It is my intention to show
Pontiac, and by extension all American Indians, as more than the one-dimensional
participants of America's past as is often their portrayal in historical texts. lndians playa
vital part in shaping America's history and the view ofPontiac as solely an opponent of
European settlement who was eventually eliminated fails to recognize how Indian
relations, hostile or friendly, contributed to American ideals and the character of its
people. Finally, specificity was essential when using the names of peoples and groups
covered in this piece. Care was taken to employ those names that the Native American
peoples used for themselves, though such an endeavor has become increasingly
complicated amid the tendency for tribes to factionalize and the intellectual desire not to
offend. The problem of European fragmentation only exacerbates this problem. The use
of terms in reference to peoples and cultures is footnoted when clarification demands.
Similarly, generalizations with regard to what comprises "Europeans," "whites,"
"Algonquins," and so forth should be gleaned from the context of the term's use and are
never meant as a pejorative. Often they are used merely to avoid repetition. P\ease take
the careful use oftenns in this spirit ofgood faith.
Finally, I would like to thank those individuals who assisted me in the completion
of this work. My sincere gratitude is extended to those members of faculty at Oklahoma
State University who offered their constructive criticism during my tenure under their
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instruction. First, my thesis committee: Professor Richard C. Rohrs, Professor
Elizabeth A. WiHiams, and Professor William S. Bryans who offered me their guidance
and encouragement, as well as altered personal schedules, to help me complete my
studies. I would also like to thank Professor James L. Huston and Professor James F.
Cooper for their feedback concerning portions ~f the piece as well as Professor Ronald A.
Petrin for his overall help at this juncture of my academic career. Others who provided
me with valued criticism of conceptual elements within the thesis also deserve
recognition. They indude Professor Mary Rowe ofCentra) Missouri State University
and Professor Gregory E. Dowd of the University of Notre Dame. lowe a special thank
you to Professor Dennis Bozyk and Professor Richard Sax. at Madonna University who
gave me a solid foundation in academe and provided me with intermittent moral support
along the way. A special note ofappreciation goes out to the Solutions Center at the
University of Notre Dame for rescuing ofa desperate graduate student without a printer.
And thanks to my fellow travelers in the graduate experience at Oklahoma State
University who served as proofreaders and sounding boards for various elements of my
thesis: John Blackburn, Dianna Di'Illio, Brad Duren, Jennifer Flint, Cindie Landrum,
Rodney Mittlestedt, Stacy Reaves, Carrie Sikes, and Mark Van de Logt. Finally, my
most humble acknowledgements go to my own Master ofLife for whom I create as well
as my grandmother, Ruby Smith, who has passed to me her Cherokee heritage by both
blood and culture. She is the reason why I continue to pursue the study of Native
American peoples, both my own and others. This has always been more to me than a
simple academic endeavor. It has become a means of providing myselfwith a sense of
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identity and a way to give some small voice to those whose lives are too often diminished
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INTRODUCTION-INDIAN SUMMER: THE ROLE OF PONTIAC IN
EURO-IND1AN AFFAIRS
By the autumn of 1763 three things were known to the inhabitants ofthe Great
Lakes region: the French were retreating to Louisiana, the British were advancing into
the Ohio Valley, and the Indians of this region were experiencing the effects of having
their embattled homelands made a coveted prize by foreigners. [n an era guided by
mercantile economic theory and aggresszve national honor, European policy transformed
territory into much more than a place to reside. Land was an asset. It meant money and
prestige for those who managed to obtain it. And many ofEurope's elites, religious and
secular, felt that the land of America embodied the hope of the future. There was one
sobering reality that awakened these colonizers from their imperial dreams, the presence
ofNative Americans who had no intention of surrendering a continent to peoples who
already had one of their own. Pontiac became their spokesman. 1
The clashes surrounding the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) showed signs of
cooling between England and France by 1760 with the former taking a decisive position
after the fall of Quebec and the latter trying to regroup in Louisiana. But hostilities were
only heating up along the western frontier in North America, inspired by Native
Americans who comprised an autonomous third body never made a party to the
discussion ofa pending cessation of war. Initially sporadic, hostilities between the
-
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presumed English victors and their assumed Indian subjects became increasingly frequent
as weB as more organized. The peoples of the Northwest found in the British crown a
common adversary and the antagonistic relationship was not simply a matter ofIndian
resistance. Many negotiations took place during the latter part of the 1750s through the
pivotal year 1763 when British agents and representatives of the Great Lakes peoples
came to the brink ofan amicable agreement. But fonowing French capitulation, the
attitude of British officials changed as a result of their interpretation of the ramifications
of Quebec's surrender. 2
The Proclamation Une of 1763 provides ample evidence as to what British poli.cy
makers had planned all along for the crown's territorial prize as well as what they were
going to do with its Native inhabitants. There were four objectives contained in this
statement of royal will. First, the boundaries of three new British provinces in North
America were defined. Second, a short-term restriction on westward settlement provided
the necessary time to create stability for the crown's administrative and economic
apparatus's construction. While the long-t,errn plan of Eng~ishoccupation provided for
crown officials to make inducements to encourage settlement of these lands by British
subjects as well as non-British Protestants. Third, Indian trade was opened to all the
people of the colonies, though under regulations never fully defined. And finally, an
assurance was given to all the inhabitants of the Trans-Appalachian region that future
settlement patterns would fall under certain strictures presumably designed to insure
Native tribal integrity and honor old treaties. The inconsistency in the fOUf goals was
obvious. The first three goals disclosed England's desire to construct its administrative




objective. Crown bureaucrats were taking an active interest in the affairs of settlers as
wen as the lives of Indians. While American colonists, in retrospect, saw the
Proclamation Line as the starting point for their eventual revolution, the Native
Americans inevitably saw it as politically devious, amounting to a tacit admission that
territorial conquest and Indian subjugation were the Crown's ultimate goals.:l
The Algonquins4 were suspicious ofEnglish motives because they had already
acclimated themselves to the French whose presence defined cultural 'ife and
expectations in the Great Lakes region. While initially holding to the notion best
expressed in the Senecas' statement, "Is it not our land? .. you [the French] may go home
directly off our Lands," the tribes eventually acquiesced to the amiable French explorers
who established outposts among them. 5 The settlement patterns ofthe French snaked
their way throughout Canada and down to Louisiana by closely fonowing lakes and
rivers. Trade was their primary motive and the waterways that flowed throughout the
interior of the continent facilitated the travel of the French traders-the Voyageurs and
Coureurs du Bois--establishing an elaborate trade network and far reaching empire under
thefleur-de-lis. While the territory was vast, the population of French colonials remained
comparatively small, resulting in a codependent relationship with the various Indian
peoples. The French became adept at working the rituals of tribal culture and even
shared some of their own, primarily religious in nature and brought over by French Jesuit
missionaries who lived among the tribes attempting to create flocks but really serving the
more useful purpose of fostering communication. The extent of French reliance upon
Indian prowess was obviated during the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. The inability
of officials to organize the disparate, ,and often mutuaily antagonistic, tribes to fight the
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English hampered their efforts from the outset. France bad learned that no matter how
much they knew of Indian cultures there still remained. some aspects of genuine
misunderstanding. 6
Such a level of cultural ignorance was even more demonstrable among the
English. Those who implemented England's w~rtime policy had their own political
struggles with bureaucrats planning for post-war administration. Sir William Johnson,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northwest Territory, became a mediator of sorts
between traders and agents in the field and royal officials making policy. The former, led
primarily by George Croghan and Major Robert Rogers, were concerned with the
potential for war once liberal trade practices were ended. The latter, led by Lord Jeffery
Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of British forces and head administrator for the crown in
America, were only concerned with social order and economic profit. Trade, however,
was more than a matter of economics; it was a means of creating trust between people of
different cultures. [ranically, Johnson's attempt to mimic the French trade network by
reconstituting what he termed "the Old Covenant Chain" became too successful. 7 By
undercutting France's trade network, prying apart the socia-political bond between the
French and Indians, and contributing directly to England's victory by winning the
confidence and potential allegiance of the Algonquin tribes, upon whom the French so
deeply relied, Johnson's plan fostered instability on the frontier and contributed to the
arrogance of British officials. Realizing the threat of new warfare as a real concern
among the Indians, English agents warned their superiors of the cuitural ramifications of
such policies as the cessation of ritual gift giving, the drop in the quality ofgoods, and,
particularly, the curtailment oftrade in gunpowder. Crown officials responded by not
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only ignoring the warnings but also often chastising the agents and traders, as well as their
Native associates, The British constantly resorted to a threat of force as a means of
enforcing their will following the Seven Years' War, and Native Americans took
exception. 8
The ultimate source of the conflict between the Indians of the Great Lakes region
and the British leadership was the latter's failure to recognize that the New World was
defined by a triangular relationship between France, England, and the Native nations.
For years the three groups had played one party off the other tor personal gai,n. With the
French gone tbe functional structure of the play-off system fell into an adversarial
relationship between the English and the Indians. Despite many historians' perceptions
that the Seven Years' War comprised a European struggle with some Indian participation
on one oftbe two sides, the connict never completely drew in the Indian nations. While
many remained neutral, more often they simply remained aloof it was not their affair
and tribes only engaged in those battles where Europeans could illustrate that it was in
the Indians' best interests to do so. More accurately, the Native Americans benefited
from the clash while ilt lasted because the opposing sides attempted to curry their favor to
obtain a superior military, economic, or diplomatic position. The Indians thrived in the
vital center, literally and figuratively, until the French leadership surrendered the western
position its forces and occupied and the British bureaucrats were allowed to envelop the
Indians from the east.9
What the British leadership failed to discern was the climate differing cultural of
perceptions. The Algonquins were characterized by French and English traders as
distraught over the loss oftheir French allies and troubled over the prospect ofliving
5
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under a British flag, Crown officials offered nothing to assuage their fears. Additionally,
Native concerns were only increased amid outbreaks of starvation, disease, drunkenness,
and internal violence. The traders, colonists, and missionaries who communicated with
them did little to help these circumstances when all they fed the Indians were rumors of
English brutality along the frontier and a pending French return that never seemed to
materialize. As British bureaucratic indifference continued with regard to those Natives'
lives it consumed, the Indian peoples scrambled to find a socio-political unity and
corporate identity. It was within this milieu that Pontiac ascended.]O
Pontiac shaped and articulated for his followers three distinct goals, each of which
was predicated on the notion that "this country was given by God to the Indians."il The
Algonquins needed a sense of unity to make a political statement carrying a diplomatic
force equal to that of their European counterparts. A religious and cultural reformation
served to provide the Ottawa chief with that sense of oneness whereby he could
communicate among his people and to foreign leaders. As the various tribes of Pontiac' s
region followed his cues, the coalition that resulted gave the Ottawa a legitimate cultural
basis upon which to mediate Euro-Indian disputes. For their part, French and English
leaders gave credence to Pontiac's central position by continually elevating him to a
prominent position during the negotiating process. Finally, as Pontiac provided a voice
for Indian nations, he also awaited the response from the European nations to his
activities. It was implicit but clear that war or peace was within his ability to control and
Pontiac refused to see his coalition driven from their land by attrition or force.
It is important to note two cultural dynamics Pontiac used adeptly during his
move toward leadership that kept him vital in the ever changing state ofEuro-lndian
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affairs: his status as Okama and the Onamia designation ascribed to the French king.
Among the Algonquins being an Okama, or in a vague sense chief, offered Pontiac the
opportunity to persuade his people, achieving rank by currying his people's favor. The
tribesmen were free to follow or disregard the actions of this tribal leader, so oratorical
skill became essential. Pontiac's skillful use of,impassioned speeches, punctuated by
wails, then followed by dances, are due less to the emotionalism of this leader and more
to his conscious attempt to present himself as a capable Okama. Furthermore, he had
alr,eady demonstrated his military prowess, an essential element of leadership among the
Algonquins, by playing a decisive role in the rout of the British officer, Edward
Braddock, in 1755. These elements added to his personal aura as he visited tribes
clandestinely toenilst their assistance. His most important tool in the art of persuasion,
though, was embodied in the use of Ononlio. This was a tenn used to designate the
French king, and indirectly his colonial governors, which loosely translates as "Great
Father.,,12 The close association of the French and Algonquins fostered an extrapolated
relationship with the habitants' leader, whom the Indians understood in terms akin to an
Okama. Onontio was to act just like Pontiac: persuasive, powerful, and generous. The
Voyageurs and Coureurs du Bois served as Onontio 's "runners," carrying out the Great
Father's reciprocal obligations. So long as quality goods came into Native possession at
fair prices, there were no difficulties. With the French having quickly comprehended at
least the functional elements ofthis assumption, Onontio's ambassadors made homes
among the tribes, married, and sired children. It is easy to see why Pontiac was so much
a Francophile. As an Okama he understood the realities of his society. The bond was,
quite literally, one of blood embodied in the Metis, or ethnically-mixed children.)) But
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rather than this becoming a weakness in a prospective pan-Indian coalition, it became a
source ofunity as Pontiac acquiesced to a continued French presence, realizing their
dependency upon Native strength at the close ofthe Seven Years' War. He could keep
utilizing France's desperation in combating England to secure supplies for his people. He
could also continue to play the English off the ~rench as the former were eager to wind
down this costly war. 14
So, culturally, diplomatically, and personally Pontiac was at the center, and it was
amid this confusion that the Okama thrived for he alone promised to make the
circumstances work to the Indians' best interests. One Lenape chief stated with regard to
their perception ofEnglish power after the faU of Quebec that they had "grown too
powerfull & seemd as if they would be too Strong for God himself." 15 What he did not
foresee was that a prophet among his own people would offer a divine vision to the
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GOD IS AREAVY BURDEN TO BEAR: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE
ASCENSION OF PONTIAC
"A man can receive only what is given him from heaven. You yourselves can
testify that I said, 'I am not the Messiah but am sent ahead of him. ",I These are the
words of John the Baptist upon hearing of the work of Jesus across the Jordan River.
"The bride belongs to the bridegroom. The friend who attends the bridegroom waits and
listens for him, and is full of joy when he hears the bridegroom's voice. That joy is mine,
and it is now complete. He must become greater; I must become less.,,2 Following this
declaration Christ emerged as central to the events of his day. Though this key figure
was regionally and culturally specific, his words and deeds reverberated throughout an
empire, eventually affecting Western Civilization of which the initial vision was not
considered a part.
An analogous situation existed between the Lenape3 prophet, Neolin; the Ottawa
war chief, Pontiac; and those European civilizations which the Natives' religious message
affected. Neolin brought to his people a more perfect way to live, much like John the
Baptist had done in his day. The Lenape prophet spoke ofa path that would lead the
people into the good graces of the Master ofLife and held that such an endeavor required
sacrifice in change. The prophet's vision was borne ofa fluid situation. The English
were continually encroaching upon Native lands and the various tribes of the Northwest
13
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were ready for a deliverer. From across the Great Lakes the voice ofa bridegroom for
Neolin's sovereign vision spread throughout the regional tribes. The Okama, Pontiac,
declared, "1 stand in the path! ,,4 Such a statement wed this man to the prophet's spiritual
message and had profound resonance among the Great Lakes tribes. A cultural path was
prepared for Pontiac by Neolin, enabling him to. lead disparate Indtan peoples into a new
understanding between the Master ofLife and the Europeans, as well as among
themselves. Pontiac fulfilled Neolin's prophecy. The spiritual and cultural legitimacy of
the Algonquins' activities were believed as deeply in factual or mythical significance as
John's and Christ's were in their time and place. Just as it is in Christian theology, the
prophesied becomes greater, the prophet becomes less. Neolin's vision spread beyond
the Lenapes and into the entire Great Lakes region offering an Indian leader the
opportunity to ascend to a role beyond the narrow confines of his own people. And, it
was Pontiac who used this vision to unite many of the Great Lakes peoples under his
leadership, guiding them into a new realm of Euro-Indian understanding.
It is not surprising that a new theology came from the Lenapes given their social
environment and loose tribal structure. English encroachment had continued unabated
for years, pushing the Indians of the northern Appalachians into the Ohio Valley amid
other peoples who were strangers to the coastal tribes. With the land supporting a larger
population as well as the reopening of trade at Fort Pitt by the British, game became
increasingly scarce. Either for food or fur, excessive hunting had resulted in widespread
starvation, which in turn produced outbreaks of disease, drunkenness, and violence within
the various Indian towns. Among Lenape villages, seers had arisen offering solutions to
their peoples' plight. Their lack of a central council and loose tribal organization, which
14
the geographic realities of resettlement had exacerbated, afforded prophets the liberty to
spread visions and beliefs among those who resided in or near their location.5
Opposing spiritual factions, which might well be referr,ed to as denominations,
competed for believers and resulted in an evolutionary cycle within Algonquin
cosmology. The Lenape culture was not static, ~specially given its existence between
French and English settlements, and it underwent religious changes that embodied
something other than a mere absorption ofChristian Europe's practices. The most
significant change that made Neolin's message so appealing was the drift toward a more
definite rdationship between the Indians and their Creator. Algonquin culture was filled
with Manitous who exacted tributes, required appeasement, and demanded sacrifices.
This belief in a multiplicity of spirits was being altered as early as 1757 by a weJIing up
of religious fervor "still in its infancy.,,6 Lenape prophets were seeing a "Master of Life
who ... was brown and beardless" as their creator, while the maker of the Europeans was
"white and bearded."? Ifviewed in light of how Neolin later refined these elements this
became more than simply evidence that so-called nativists were winning the theological
debate. Rather, what should be construed from this development is that the Lenapes were
attempting to resolve their dual theology dilemma internally, quite apart from missionary
influence, in an effort to respond to the Ellropean presence with a single voice. The
central theme of this broad-based reformation was a "belief in two spirits, one good, the
other bad, the one inhabiting the heavens, the other the bowels of the earth."g The
genesis of this reformation theology "goes back only to the time they commenced trade
with Europeans," thus it was as much a product of Indian experiences as it was a






successes were more accurately, negligible; few sincere converts were WOD. SO, the
dynamic at work among the Indians of the Northwest is more accurately described as a
search for a sense ofoneness, and religion became a common language which spoke to
this end. lo
Taking the visions as a whole, two disti~ct spiritual trends are discernible
amongst the Lenape prophets. The first can be described as a synthesis of religious
themes, Christian and Algonquin, in an effort to accommodate the European presence. A
man named Papounhan led the most significant of these in the 1750s with a theology bent
on pacifism and similar to that given him by Quaker missionaries, prompting many to
refer to those who adhered to this theology as "Quaker Indians." I I A competing theology
appeared subsequent to the first led by one Wangomen. This trend witnessed the rise of
nativism, or a call for a return to traditional modes of living, and a separation of all races
existing in the region: red, white, and even black. It was tacitly more aggressive in that
its adherents subtly called for the expulsion of all Europeans from Indian lands. With the
many social forces pulling the Indian communities apart, the prophets' task was to
provide sense of unity. For Neolin such unity resided in a harmonization of the opposing
theological trends which ultimatel y provided Pontiac with a symbolic vocabulary through
which he drew together the converted tribes in support of a political vision that mirrored
this spiriltual counterpart. 12
Neolin received the vision that was eventually coupled with Pontiac's actions
sometime between 1760-1762 and it stands as a final reconciliation of the dual
theological paths cr,eated by the Lenapes; it provided aU the peoples of the Great Lakes
area with a single path to atonement with their Creator. 13 The vision initially entered by
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way of a sp)rit in the form of"a man who came to [Neolin] by night while he sat by the
fire alone and perfectly awake."l4 The Lenape was "by himself musing & greatly
concerned about the evil ways he saw prevailing among the indians" when this figure
arrived, becoming a sort ofheaveniy confirmation of the prophet's suspicions. l5 He told
Neolin that "these things he was thinking of were right & that all who fonow evill ways
should goe to a Miserable Place aftr they dies but that those who hated all Evill & lived
agreable to the mind of God should aftr Death be taken up to God & made happy for
Ev,er.,,16 The broad cosmological situation was made clear in this first communication
from the Great Spirit. The evolving monotheistic dimension of Algonquin religion
brought in by the "Quaker Indians" was retained, but the components of pacifism and
assimilation were discarded during Neolin's continuing dialog with the Master ofLife.
In retaining the exciusivist aspects ofnativist theology, this new religion infused an air of
the traditional and departed from any influences Christianity had upon the message. 17
The finam version ofthe vision that spread throughout the Indian villages,
inspiring Pontiac's conversion and activity, presented the various peoples with a theology
designed to foster intertribal communication. The Lenape prophet communed with a
single god whom he referred to by name, "the Master ofLife," and whose role in the
universe was explained to Nealin as "He who hath created the heavens and the earth, the
trees, lakes, riv·ers, all men, and all that thou seest and hast seen upon the earth.,,18 This
great creator dismantled Algonquin spirituality by altering the nature of the Indians'
relationship with their Creator and the expression of their faith. The Master used a gentle
tone with his creation, often speaking of his love for all the people of the earth. Neolin




,questions regarding the white presenoe within the Natives' lands. He asked the prophet if
his people could live without white assistance. implying that they should forsake
technological implements like flints, tools, and guns for technoiogy only fostered a
harmful dependency. Such a reasonable deity was unknown to the Algonquin, their lives
being filled with an array of malevolent Manitolls. But Neolin related that all of this was
a lie. Just as there was one benevolent god, there was only one evil counterpart, a single
Manitou whose retention by the prophet kept this theology distinctly Algonquin. Neolin
"had been ordered to shew [this] to the Indians, that they might see the situation in which
[tlUs] Mannitto had originally placed them, [this] misery which they had brought upon
themselves by neglecting their duty, and the only way that was now left them to regain
what they had lost,,,19 that being conversion to this new doctrine20
The Master of Life then asked Neolin to commit this message to writing and use it
as a means of persuading others to share in this new vision. Neolin proceeded to draw up
an illustrated map he referred to as "the great Book or Writing,,21 that related the situation
of the Indians as the Master of Life had explained it. The combined use of this
pictographic map and the prophet's "almost constant crying whilst he was exhorting" the
groups he visited helped the vision transcend linguistic barriers and facilitated a grasp of
the importance Neolin placed upon the message?2 Just as the printing press promoted
Reformation theology across Europe, causing it to seep through all the layers of society,
this theology recorded on deerskins traversed the Great Lakes producing a profound and
. d I 23vane resu t.
Much has been made of the putative syncretistic nature of this prophecy, but such








by Pontiac. Christian themes did permeate Neolin' s message. There was a single power
for good standing in opposition to a single power for eviL The human soul was longing
for paradise where "fat and plump" blessings awaited the righteous, while humanity also
labored under the threat of being "carried to ... regions ... where the ground was parched up
by the heat for want ofrain.,,24 There was also.a loose concept of sin or human
culpability for misery as Neolin chastised followers for not seeing what they had "lost by
neglect and disobedience; by being remiss in the expression of [their] gratitude to the
Great Spirit.,,25 But such comparisons play upon vague concepts common to all mystery
religions, of which Christianity is only one. Furthermore, Neolin did not express an
interest in Christian theology to any great extent until 1766, after the events that his
vision induced were effectively over. So, these links between the Lenape prophet's
vision and Christian missionary influence have mundane as well as abstract difficulties.26
Clearly what Neolin addressed was the specific social plight of the Indians with
whom he came in contact. There is little doubt that many strictures calling for abstinence
from excessive vices produced parallels between Christian and Native beliefs, but what
practices were denoted as evil as well as those rituals prescribed to restore moral virtue
among adherents were decidedly Indian in form and function. Neolin included among
the "sacrifices" caned for by the Master of Life rules similar to the Christian tenet of
"abstinence from carnal knowledge of the other sexes.,,27 An end to the use ofother
traditional practices like medicine bundles, designed to curry favor with Manitous, also
pleased missionaries who had long desired to end such pagan customs. But Neolin also
instituted many tenets that encompassed "customs... adopted since the white people






prophet called for the us,e of"emetics," traditional herbal drinks concocted by many
tribes that induced vomiting to represent a physical manifestation of a total purge of
white culture from their bodies. Strtctures such as these eventually became the most
important to the new vision and bore the distinctive marks of negative experiences with
Europeans, thus owing nothing to Christian influence. Neolin declared that the Master of
Life commanded his Native children to "quit the use offueanns" and even make their
fires by "rubbing two sticks together" for "fire was not pure that was made by flint and
steel.,,29 Finally, Neolin ordered adherents to "abstain from drinking [the Europeans']
deadly beson [alcohol], which they have forced upon us, for the sake of increasing their
gains and diminishing our numbers. ,,30 While this practice, as such, might have pleased
some Christian sects, the real point of its inclusion to the Native Americans was to put an
end to the facilitation oftheir own demise. So, the ascription of the concept of sin owes
much to the tendency of missionaries who viewed the nativist developments attempting
to understand and convey what was happening by groping for an analogous religious
theme within their own Christian theology. J I
In seeing the social complexities ofNeolin's time and region, his visionary ability
becomes more pronounced. Within the Great Lakes region both Protestant and Catholic
missionaries affected Indian culture and the Lenapes, in particular, who resided in the
Upper Ohio Vaney, felt the influence ofEnglish Quakers, German Moravians, and
French Jesuits who were an seeking converts. It was within this national and theological
mixture that Neolin's vision spread and within this same sectarian pool that the imagery
associated with his vision provided for a potent means ofpersuasion across tribal barriers.
The Lenapes, with their deeply-held religious convictions and fluid interaction with other
20
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peoples, were recognized by the Europeans as the "canaille who stU- up the rest to
mischief,,32
Neolin's influence upon Pontiac's life began with the Okama's having had ample
opportunity to hear the new doctrine. Many trips were made on the part of the Ottawas
and their chief to forts throughout the region, m~st notably Fort Pitt. Pontiac encountered
the Lenapes and their theology during these meetings to discuss trade with English
officials. The commonalties of not only Algonquin culture but also the feeling of
constriction between the European powers made Pontiac's heart a willing vessel for the
reception of the vision. As the message was recorded on animal pelts., bartered for "one
buckskin or two deerskins apiece," many preachers returned to their homelands or
traveled abroad to spread Neolin's gospel.33 Appeals to traditional spiritual
intermediaries, described as "Little Gods" by one white missionary, all.owed for the
dissemination ofa broad form of the doctrine throughout peoples who were not Lenape,
for it was ambiguous enough to provide for the integration of local spiritual traditions
within the overall cosmological framework provided by the Master of Life. Pontiac's
Ottawas were no exception to thi s spiritual adaptation process. English travelers
encountered a holy man, Katapelleecy, in 1764. A confidant ofPontiac, he maintained
that he, too, heard from the Great Spirit and this gave Pontiac the corroboration for his
own reteHing of Neolin's initial vision. This internalization ofthe Lenape vision into
Ottawa culture, as well as its reconciliation ofNeolin's spiritual abstractions and
Pontiac's temporal realities, provided the Ottawa war chief with a valid means of











By deconstructing Pontiac's relation of the vision it is apparent that the Ottawa
chief was marrying his personal fortunes to Neolin's dream and the interpretation of its
imagery was used to draw together the various tribes. In Pontiac's retelling of the
prophet's celestial meeting, he brought out symbols that had an association to various
Christian doctrines. What was being perfonned was a subtle appeal to the tribal status
enjoyed by missionaries resulting from years of contact. He begins with his own Council
of the Three Fires-a confederation comprising the Ottawas, Ojibways,35 and
Potawatomis-and fellow Algonquins, the Wyandots.36 Pontiac spoke ofNeolin having
a female intermediary who led him to the Master of Life. She was a "woman... of radiant
beauty, whose garments dimmed the whiteness of the snow" upon the mountain he had to
climb to reach his destination. 37 Pontiac then related that she told the prophet to "disrobe
completely, and leave all thy trappings and clothing at the foot of the mountai.n ... {and to]
go and bathe thyself in a river" she pointed OUt.38 Only then did Neolin proceed to
ascend the mountain. Among these peoples Catbolicism was a strong influence, brought
to them by the Jesuits, many ofwhom were still ministering and residing with the
Indians, and Pontiac was aware of this circumstance. The correlation between the female
guide and Mary are overt, not to mention the powerful reference to water immersion to
purify oneself and the baptismal sacrament, all elements stressed by Jesuit missionaries.
Beyond this, the Algonquin culture was matrilineal. The female images inherent in
Catholicism, as well as Pontiac's oratory, facilitated an understanding of the vision
eventually leading to many conversions. Once Neolin was atop the mountain, Pontiac's
interpretation of the prophet's journey expanded in its regional as well as religious nature.




missionaries-Quakers and Moravians-were establishing flocks. Having left his earthly
vestiges at the foot of the mountain, Neolin waited to be given access to a group of three
villages surrounded by a fence. The Great Spirit eventually opened a gate for him and
Nealln was granted an audience. The Master of Life immediately "gave him a hat all
bordered with gold to sit down upon. ,,39 This is a curious image for Indians to
comprehend especially given the Three Fires Tribes' predilection for physical
adomment,40 but it is understandable given the context ofboth the Quakers' and
Moravians' almost fanatical stance against human vanity. Th.e former reference to
Neolin's waiting for the Master of Li£e to open the gate has connections to the
importance of God's sovereignty within the Calvinist theology ofboth Protestant sects in
question. It is clear that Pontiac was utilizing all the religious imagery available to him to
reach beyond tribal separations. But simply communicating beyond tribal and religious
divisions was not enough to draw the Natives together completely. He needed a unifying
element4l
A lingering affinity for the French, which was shared by the Algonquins, lay at
the heart of Pontiac's desire to explain his fulfilling Neolin's vision as the Ottawa chief
retold the discussion between the prophet and the Master ofLife. Pontiac's point with
regard to the French was not simply a return to their way oflife before the Seven Years'
War when a balance existed between European powers on Indian lands. Rather, the
Ottawa chief made certain to comment upon the dependent nature of their relationship.
"1 know that those whom yecall the ,children of your Great Father [the French] supply
your needs ... ye could surely do without them. ... But when I saw that ye were given up






your brothers [the French] to fe,ed and shelter yoU.',42 The Master ofLife, in Pontiac's
presentation, merely explained that he had made a land for the Indians and a land for the
Europeans. The actions ofeach group muddled this relationship. The Great Spirit loved
both, and Pontiac spoke to this, and in doing so he began distinguishing the s'des of the
looming struggle between good and evil, refining the elements of the struggle to
incorporate explicitly the temporal loyalties oftne Indians. The French "know me and
pray to me, and I supply all their wants and all they give you," explained the Master of
Life. 43 Here Pontiac implied that their association with the French existed on Native
terms, sanctioned by god who was working through them. "But as to those who come to
trouble your lands,-drive them out, make war upon them. I do not love them at all; they
know me not, and are my enemies, and the enemies ofyour brothers.,,44 Again, the
divisions are implicit. But as Pontiac continued to intone the words of the Master of Life,
he made explicit the social realities the Indians dealt with as a result of their association
with the French. "I do not forbid you to permit among you the children of your Father
[the French]," stated the Great Spirit, but only when the Indians "drive off [the] lands
those dogs clothed in red [the British] who will do you nothing but harm" will he grant
the Natives his good favor. 45 Through this careful relation ofNeolin' s prophetic journey,
Pontiac had synthesized the religious vision with the Indians' existence between the
European peoples and cast the mission he wanted to lead in terms that the tribes
concerned could each understand. 46
Lest any doubt exist regarding Pontiac's interpretive consistency with that of
Neolin's words, parallels between the prophet's initial vision and the Okama 's refinement















contention that the Ottawa chief merely harnessed Indian zeal for his own political ends
loses support when Pontiac's apparent shift ofNeolin' s vision from being ambiguously
anti-white to being clearly anti-British is considered. The Ottawa leader did little to alter
the intent of the Lenape's vision. Rather, the implication ofthat original message
regarding contempt for white settlers ofEnglish. nationality became a matter that was lost
in the process of translation on the part of European witnesses. Neolin, himself, meant
the vision as anti-British. This interpretation is based upon the specificity of the Lenape
language. They had used <La word for Europeans in general (Schwonack), for Anglo-
American settlers (Choanshikan), and for the French (Pe/aeiman, derived from the
English word, Frenchman). Even if we assume that Neolin employed the term
Schwonack, he still may have been understood to mean the British, the most common
Europeans in the recent Delaware, if not Ottawa, experience.,,47 Moreover, culture and
experience support this contention. The Lenapes braved the threat ofassault on the part
of the Onondagas, members of the Iroquois confederacy, who resided next to the Lenapes
and became enforcers of British policy by the crown's strategic design, for siding with
the French at the onset of the Seven Years' War. English settlers had also manipulated
Native peoples in the Pennsylvania region in the quest for land for many years leading to
considerable animus. Add to this that Neolin's people expressed a personal fondness for
the Frenchmen they encountered after relocating in the west and the experiential context
of Neolin' s prophecy gives credence to the anti-British implication which Pontiac merely
d 1· . 48rna e exp ICII.
There was also a tacitly aggressive tone to Neolin's message to which Pontiac







men had called for daily prayers, emetic purges, and devotion to the behavioral elements
of the vision as a moral basis for any pending diplomatic or militaristic moves.49 Almost
foreshadowing Pontiac's own declarations, Neolin stated that only after obedience to the
Master of Life' s revelations would "the Great Spirit give success to our [the Indians']
arms; then he will give us strength to conquer o!Jr enemies, to drive them from hence, and
recover the passage to the heavenly regions which they have taken from us. ,,50 The
prophet also promised his converts that "they would, in a few years, be able to drive the
white people out of their country.,,51 Such phenomenological elements to Native
prophecies were an essential means for adherents to gauge the truth of a given spiritual
message. The Algonquins were not emotional zealots easily duped by a charismatic
display on the part ofa would-be leader. Certainly a good delivery was a necessary
component in appealing to tribesmen, but the lack ofany explicit coercive mechanisms
within AJgonquin religion or politics made success the essential ingredient in any
professed solution. On this matter, both Neolin and Pontiac were forced to make
promises and have them brought to fruition. In this vision, the promise was simply an
elimination ofthe British menace. But since Pontiac's ascension was divinely inspired,
the Ottawa chiefeventually found the demand for tangible results as proof of holy
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CHAPTER THREE
TRAPPED ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIAN UNITY, EUROPEAN
RESPONSES, AND PONTIAC AS MEDIATOR
The i\.lgonquins' occupancy of the middle ground between French and English
territorial claims placed them not only at the geographic center, but the diplomatic center
as well. Neolin's vision was being spread throughout the region. Messengers with belts,
prophecies, and calls for councils added a political compliment to the sense of unity that
this vision inspired. And the one name that was heard most frequently by 1763 was that
of the Ottawa War chief, Pontiac. As the coalescing tribes became more aware of
Pontiac's rhetoric, skills, and promises, so too did the English and French officials who
wanted to coax the Indians over to their side and thus tip the balance of power in their
favor. Both European powers had a dual mission of winning the Seven Years' War and
securing financial benefits in the form of trade. These goals were not mutually exclusive.
From the Indian perspective, good trade created trust, demonstrated prestige, and ensured
tranquility. The French were aware of these Native assumptions and used their shared
experiences with the Algonquins to their advantage whenever possible. But English
traders, having daily contact with Algonquins, were coming to understand what tne
French had seemingly always known. By approaching the Indians on their own terms
one could curry favor. And it was France's Onontio status that Superintendent of Indian




growing legion of fonowers, was the only Indian leader who could fulfil this
Englishman's desire. While Pontiac remained politically supple enough to negotiate with
the British, his sincere conversion to Neolin's doctrine coupled with great cultural
affronts committed by English officials inevitably drove the Ottawa chi,ef and his
loyalists toward the French in the west geographically and diplomatically. The middle
ground that Pontiac controlled was thus transformed into a field of battle.
Neolin's message also called for a gradual conversion process wherein allowances
were made for a leader to mediate on behalf of those Indians following his message.
Pontiac became that spokesman. The period of disassociation from British supplies was
to take sev,en years under Neohn's plan. Purportedly, this would give the Indians time to
adapt to their new modes of living. Negotiation was a must in the interim and Pontiac
seized upon this time to secure support from the French, thus bis supplemental claim
from the Master ofLife that "when [He] saw that ye were given up to evil, [He] led the
wild animals to the depths of the forests so that ye had to depend upon your brothers [the
French] to feed and shelter yoU."l Pontiac merely demonstrated that those successes
enjoyed by the Indians during their interaction with the French were evidence of the
Great Spirit being pleased with Indian obedience. By bestowing blessings upon His
children, Neolin's vision was given phenomenological support and Pontiac's intertribal
Okama status was reinforced. 2
Harmony between prophet and prophesied was reflected in the actions of their
toUowers as tribes throughout the region continued to internalize Neolin' s vision just as
Pontiac had done and that only facilitated the Ottawa's ascension. Bands ofLenapes
reoeded into the mountains to apply the new teachings to their daily lives. They made
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use "of no other weapons than their bows and arrows," rejected European trade goods,
and lived off the land. 3 Members of the Three Fires Council, particularly the.
Potawatomis, continued a pattern of close association with the French still in their region.
They feared that "if[they] suffer[ed] the English among [them, they] were dead men.,,4
"Sickness, smallpox, and [the Englishmen's] poison will destroy you entirely"
admonished the Master of Life and the Indians lived in fear and trembling of these
words. 5 Many even continued to practice religious rites with French Jesuits both to
maintain good relations and absorb any extra spiritua' power available to them; thus, they
sought out priests to baptize them as a safeguard against divine retribution. Neolin,
himself, even followed Pontiac's practice of using imagery to promote cultural
understanding and persuade the Shawnees to join them. He likened the religious message
to a "bitter water ... to purge out an that they got from ye White peoples ways and
Nature.,,6 The Shawnees often used a bitter drink metaphor in relation to their own
cultural exclusivity. 7
It also had a practical expression through the use of emetics. The Shawnees were
not specificaBy related to the Great Lakes' AJgonquins, rather they were closer in culture
and language to the Iroquois of the eastern shores of the North American continent.
Particularly among Iroquois peoples of the southeast, the use of herbal brews to purge the
body and soul was common and the Shawnees retained such a cultural distinction.
Neolin moved to the Shawnee town ofWakatornica shortly after his vision to flee British
military threats as well as to continue to spread his message. Wakatomica was home to
many Indians who nourished within themselves a strident opposition to a continued
English presence in the region. Neolin and his Shawnee associates finally mixed
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theology and culture in the form of a "black drink" which the Master of Life told the
prophet to consume. The subsequent conversion ofthe Shawnees to Neolin's vision and
the utilization of emetics as a sort of sacrament was so widespread that the missionaries
took to calling Wakatomica simply "vomit town."a So here Neolin used the emetic and
1ts image to entice fellow tribes while broadenin.g the confines of the drink's usage to
apply to Indian exclusivity, therein taking on the Euro-Indian dichotomy Pontiac
articulated. Finally, the Indians of the region who converted to this new religion began a
common cultural communication in the "proffer [of] the left hand which is nearest the
heart.,,9 The idea was to give "the heart along with the hand" to fellow believers, for in
doing so they shared in their bond both heartfelt beliefs as well as pending temporal
actions. 10
In all, the Master of Life had spoken to his people through Neolin, but the prophet
as well as all Indian believers knew an active component, a war chief, would seize upon
his vision. There was little regard given to the threat afforce by the English. Lenapc,
Shawnee, and Wyandot leaders told their English counterparts that the Indians were
aware "the English always told them that they had as many men as there were leaves on
the trees,-but that they [the Indians] looked upon one Indian as a thousand of them, and
notwithstanding they are but Mice in Comparison to them, they will bite as hard as they
can." J I The hope of every Indian was that their small number would enable them to wage
a more effective campaign. The Lenapes reiterated that sentiment. Speaking by way of
analogy, they explained that "when you look for a wild turkey you cannot always find it,
it is so little it hides itself under the bushes: and when you hunt for a rattlesnake, you
cannot find it; and perhaps it will bite you before you see it.,,12 NeoJin was aware of the
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state of affairs in the Great Lakes region. The British came to make war against the
French as well as any Indians who crossed royal will. The Master ofLife told his
children how they should conduct themselves regarding these affairs as the Lenape
prophet stated casually to a missionary and trader that he thought "there will be Two or
Three Good Talks and then War.,,13 With a vision present, an Indian leader was required
to give that vision voice on behalf of its many believers, and that leader who saw
disparate tribes unite, like so many beads in a wampum bdt, which he would then carry
into war was Pontiac. 14
Pontiac then utilized Native customs to strengthen the burgeoning diplomatic
alliance. The French became adept at performing rituals and understood their
significance in some measure, though mainly their desire was to avoid offending their
Native associates. So, Pontiac's stature among the coalescing tribes can be gleaned from
the constant surfacing of wampum belts. The French had given Pontiac the first belt
through the Wea tribe which followed Pontiac's new path. He was told that "Ononteeo
[the French king] was not crushed as the English had reported, but had got upon his legs
again.... That a French army had l.anded in Louisiana, and that [Louis XV] would drive
the English out of the country." 15 Pontiac believed his course of action clear, and he used
Onomio to unite the Francophile tribes. During his grand council at the Ecorse River
near Detroit in May 1763, the Ottawa chiefbegan his speeches, presenting Onon/to 's
belts to prospective followers. Other belts were also presented that had reached him
through the Senecas-a French ally of the Iroquois League whose other five tribes were
under the influence of Sir William Johnson, Superintendent ofIndian Affairs for the
British Crown16_and various habitants, many ofwhom did not want to live under a
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British flag at Detroit. Pontiac exhorted his tribesmen, particularly fellow Okamas. to
follow his lead. By the end of his speech they "told him that he had only to speak and
they were all ready to do what he demanded ofthem."n
Throughout his entire association with both French and English representatives
Pontiac's personal leanings toward the former ~ave much to do with constant shifts in
European pohcy. P,ersonality clashes erupting internally with each ofthe European
powers vying for the chiefs loyalty only prompted him to cling to the Frenchmen he
could trust. Traders had closer associations with the Natives than crown administrators.
The traders interacted on a social level and possessed a better understanding ofhow the
processes of communication work,ed between the European and Native cuhures. It is
within this group that the first hint of Pontiac's importance to the Europeans became
apparent.
When trade practices became abusive and illicit the Ottawa chiefused the issue to
turn Onontio's obligation of supp.tying the Indians against their Father. Pontiac was
aware that his warriors were the key to prolonging the war and he used this knowledge to
keep his op,tions plentiful and prominence high. The commandant of Fort Ponchartrain,
Frantyois Marie Picote, Sieur de Bellestre, was fully cognizant of Pontiac's activities in
attempting to secure an acceptable settlement for his people. Realizing Pontiac was in a
hospitable mood, at least diplomatically, BeHestre attempted to communicate to the
Ottawa chiefand his followers the consequences of soliciting British gifts. Bellestre
stated flatly that the crown ofEngland planned only "slavery" and "destruction" for the
Indians. 18 His advice was for the Detroit area tribes to relocate near Kaskaskia in
present-day Illinois. Such advice fit nicely into French diplomatic developments as well
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as military strategy. After Bellestre's council with Pontiac, the French commandant was
planning to surrender Fort Ponchartrain to Major Robert Rogers, the British
representative negotiating with him at the time. The fall ofCanada was a foregone
conclusion. The French planned to regroup in the west, then launch another offensive
utilizing Pontiac's Indians, but what betrayed B~Hestre's plans were the activities of the
J'esuits. 19
The "black robes,,20 became the self-proclaimed moral arbiters of this critical
period and, as such, served as the most effective, if unsuspecting, informants for an
Okama like Pontiac. Throughout the Seven Years' War the Jesuits were at odds with the
King, the colonial governors, as well as the milmtary officials concerning the presence of
the Voyageurs llnd Courellrs du Bois. Louis XV had outlawed their trade in New France
during the war for fear of supplying pro-British Indians. But the French trade continued
unabated instigated by military officials aware ofthe obligations of gift giving. The
Jesuits, for the sake of peace and their own power, exposed these practices and even
asserted that the Voyageurs and Coureurs du Bois had been skimming profits with the
assistance of BeHestre. Pontiac manipulated the situation through the Wyandots. This
tribe under his leadership was factiona!iz'ed between "good Hurons" and "bad Hurons,"
the first group was prompted to remain peaceful by Father Poitier who threatened to
withhold sacraments, the second group was following Pontiac's new vision. 21 For these
Wyandots loyal to Pontiac, such a religious threat had no force. The Ottawa chief used
the divided Wyandots and the apolitical Jesuits to send a half-truth that reached Lord
Jeffery Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the New World. "The
chiefs of the Hurons, Sir, answered that by several Frenchmen they had already learned
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of the truth of the mischievous news [of Pontiac] and... that they knew their interests too
well and what they owed their wives, children, and themselves that they had not
received the wampum belts [ofOnontio] and ifthey haddone so [it would have]
render[ed] themselves guilty of monstrous ingratitude and treason" toward the British
with whom they had negotiated.22 Such diplomacy as this enabled Pontiac to continue to
talk with both the British and French, acquire gifts that the Okama could distribute
among his Indians, and create a role for himself as a mediator between the three
peoples. 23
The British exploited this slight lag in the diplomatic retationship between French
traders and Pontiac, further illustrating the Ottawa chief s importance in holding sway
over his peopIe' s actions. Trader George Croghan traveled with Major Robert Rogers to
entreat the Indians of the Northwest to establish an alliance with England. Pontiac was
the man with whom they learned they must negotiate, thus they knew he must be gained
to their interests. Upon approaching the Detroit area, Croghan and Rogers were stopped
by Pontiac's Ottawas and demanded to know their business. The British officials
explained that they had come to take command ofFort Detroit and, for the first time,
spoke ofthe demise of the French in Quebec. This information exposed the pretense of
BeHestre's relocation plan in a very public.. Capitalizing on the diplomatic gaffe, Rogers
presented the Indians with a wampum belt that gave credence to his account of the
situation. The Ottawas l·eft to hold a council meeting, then returned to offer the British
representatives the opportunity to legitimize their presence in the Indians' territory
through performing the ritual of the Calumet, a pipe of peace held in high regard and
endued with sacred obligations to uphold any agreements reached while it was smoked.
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Croghan and Rogers perfonned the rite and the Ottawas agreed to accompany them on
their trek toward Detroit offering protection and labor. Such assistance proved valuable
in spreading the word that the British had entered the region and that Pontiac permitted
their visit. A group ofWyandot warriors halted Croghan's and Rogers's trip to the fort
after Bellestre falsely excited them with news ofa pending British invasion. The
Wyandots paused after seeing the Ottawas traveling with the Englishmen. Rogers
produced another belt while explaining that the Indians would '"live happily in their own
country.,,25 He added a request, asking the Natives to, "Tell [their]1 warriors to mind their
fathers (the French) no more, for they are aU prisoners to your brothers (the English),
who pitied them, and left them their houses and goods, on their swearing by the Great
One who made the world, to become Englishmen forever. They are now your brothers; if
you abuse them, you affront me, unless they behave i11.,,26 After receiving word that
Croghan and Rogers planned to meet with the local tribes in two days, the Wyandots and
Ottawas left for their homes "in good temper.,,27 The British were easing into a position
of legitimate power through a sincere effort to approach the Algonquins on a cultural
basis, performing Native rituals and adhering to accepted protocol.2K
Bellestre continued to facilitate British advances with ill-advised reactions to
Pontiac's negotiations with the new arrivals. Pontiac never responded to requests by the
commandant that he move his people west. So the Frenchman attempted a diplomatic
snub ofthe British to acquire more time for talks with the Ottawa chief. Tbe French
commander dispatched messengers to Croghan and Rogers asking to see official orders
from their superiors regarding surrender of the post. Rogers constantly responded by
giving him the papers accompanied with an explanation, but always to little immediate
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avaiL As the letter exchanges continued, Pontiac approached the British representatives
at their encampment asking to hold the negotiations promised with the Algonquins. The
meetings proceeded until BeUestre was made aware ofthis development. Seeing that his
delay tactics did not work, the Frenchman sent an emissary to Pontiac during his talks
with Croghan who stated that "the French were very angry with the Indian Nations fOli
meeting with [Croghan] and threatened to bum down their townS.,,29 This was a
monumental blunder on the part ofBellestre for the one advant.age the French still had,
Onontio status, obliged them to care for their Indian children. Croghan assured the chief
he "might depend on it, that if any damage was done them by tbe French that we [the
English] would see the damage repaired."JO Pontiac closed the meeting and agreed to
travel "with some chiefs ... to Fort Pitt to sound out the English" and that in the interim he
would allow "Rogers and a handful of Men to take possession of the Fort [at Detroit], and
Colony.,,31 The personal abuse suffered by Bellestre only compounded his diplomatic
failure. Hanging from the fort's flagpole was "a wooden effigy ofa man's head on the
top, and upon that a crow... tbe crow was to represent himself, the man's head [Rogers's],
and the meaning of the whole, that [Bellestre] would scratch out his brains.,,32 Upon
seeing the sign, Pontiac's followers merely told the French commandant that "the reverse
would be the true explanation of the sign.,,33 The Ottawa people proceeded to receive the
British "with Joy, and us[ed] Monsieur Belletre [sic] with much disrespect.,,34
Rogers continued the talks as Croghan returned with word to his superior, Sir
WiUiam Johnson, that Pontiac was prepared to give Onontio status to England. Johnson,
seeing the importance ofwinning over Pontiac, was making plans to negotiate personally
with the Ottawa chief who had placed himself at the center of the balance between peace
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and war. Rogers continued to deliver "friendly messages, or belts ofwampllm, which he
[Pontiac] received. ,,35 Pontiac, in tum, "enquired whether I [Rogers1wanted: anything
that his country afforded, and he would send a warrior to fetch itT,36 The major was
careful to follow Algonquin protocol and not refuse gifts. He duly compensated Pontiac
for his offerings of com and other sustenance which demonstrated to the chief that a
lasting relationship was plausible. The Ottawa "assured [Rogers], that he was inclined to
live peaceably with the English... and to encourage their settling ofthe country; but,
intimated, that, if they treated him with neglect, he would shut up the way, and exclude
them from it. ,,37 Pontiac then brought the Calumet to Rogers. The two performed the
ritual and Pontiac agreed to continue to prot,ect Rogers and his men from any harm.
Pontiac left to negotiate with Johnson and their council was a success. Johnson followed
similar protocol offering wampum belts, gifts, and promises of generous trade tenns if
Pontiac would merely keep his warriors at peace. Pontiac was thus persuaded into
presenting his people with a new Great Father and stability in the region seemed
secured. 38
Eventually the British wasted this opportunity to lure their Ottawa adversary away
from the French because higher officials altered policy. As the Seven Years' War ended,
Crown diplomats and military officials tried to settle the question ofhow to occupy the
newly-conquered French territory. Lord Amherst was quick with an answer. The
solution he offered, however, showed more of his ignorance of Algonquin culture than
any skills he possessed in the art of statesmanship. Amherst ordered the practice of gift
giving halted, raised the prices of trade goods to recoup war debts, and sent word through
his field agents that "the Indians should live by the Hunting and not think that they are
always to be reoeiving presents.,,39 Croghan wrote to Johnson that Pontiac and his people
asked "ye reason that we [the British] allways was Calling them to Council During ye
[Seven Years'] War and Giving them presents. and Now Take No Notice ofthem.,,4Q He
continued with an ominous sentiment in regard to Pontiac's potential for war adding the
Indians believed "ye French was butt a poor peple butt they allways Cloathed any lndians
that was poor or Naked when they come to see them.,,41 Croghan was not so subtle when
he wrote Johnson that, "If they [the Indians] ware united I am of the opinion that we
should Soon have an Indian Warr.,,42 Johnson took such pleas from his agents seriously
and petitioned Amherst to change his policies. He warned Amherst oftbe breach in tribal
etiquette and the interpretations Pontiac would have of such an action as weJl as the dire
repercussions. Amherst told Johnson that these plots were "Meer Bugbears" and
admonished him that if Pontiac summoned a war whoop among his people it would be
the "Greatest nUsfortune that befall them [the IndiansJ,,,43 Amherst then heaped personal
insult on his subordinate by ordering him to infonn Croghan that the presents given to
Pontiac at Fort Pitt were not authorized and that recompense must be offered to the
Crown by Croghan himself; the trader was docked one year's salary.44
As his agents were almost in league against him, Amherst resorted to cloaked
means of controlling Indian hostility. If the Indians listened to the Jesuits, the Order was
the best means of keeping the tribes in check.. Using Father Du Jaunay, Father Poitier,
and Father Girault, all missionaries to Pontiac's tribes, Amherst offered simple gifts of
poor quality so as to appear sincere in their desire to assist the mendicants while not
costing the British government much money. The priests gladly accepted. The British




But while the Jesuits exerted some control, Pontiac exerted more. Amhersfs actions
greatly offended the Indians and they spoke of them often after Pontiac's return.. 46 The
Jesuits could see the cultural implications that would resutt for the British and that
vehement opposition meant the priests' deaths. This policy only earned Amherst Jesuit
neutrality, not Indian neutrality, and the tribes of the Great Lakes turned to their Okama
for guidance. Pontiac decided to look west toward the French in the Louisiana Territory.
Like the British, French authorities were undergoing their own policy shift and such a
shift had Pontiac's aid factored in by design. The Ottawa chief was far from
marginalized as Amherst had hoped.47
French officials decided to redouble their efforts to retain the services of Pontiac
while they renewed their assault on British forces, and Pontiac finally agreed to "try
[Onontio 's] hatchet upon the English," making himself the key obstacle in England's
desired hegemony.48 As Pontiac was discussing acceptance of the British presence in
Detroit and being insulted by BeUestre, the Governor of the Louisiana Territory, Louis
Billouart de Kerlerec, conspired with the besieged Canadian governor, Pierre-Franyois de
Vaudreuil, to initiate a contingency pian to rescue New France. Put simply, the plan was
guerilla warfare using French troops in concert with Indians. Colonel de Jumilhac, who
brought the idea to Kerlerec, described the style of engagement as "less offensive [than]
defensive on the part of French troops. It is by means of the [Indians], to whom the
governor provides an officer to command them and a small detachment of troops, that we
wage offensive war... in the extremities of the colonies. ,,49 Further, "This type of warfare
gives rise to the necessity of veteran officers, who are familiar with the manners and
customs ofthe different tribes.',50 Thus the French strategy included the Indians as
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partners. As such, the leaders ofLouisiana had to contract with the leaders of the Indians
if they wanted to begin this covert campaign against the English. The one most capable
ofbringing enough Indian military prowess to bear was Pontiac. Wampum was circulated
throughout the Great Lakes and the persuasive name of Onontio was invoked. "Pontiac,
wholly occupied with his project and nourishing in his heart a poison which was to be
fateful to the English, and perhaps the French" took Kerlerec's promises ofgifts and
supplies and war belts were sent throughout his tribes. 51 At the council Pontiac called for
unified action saying, "It is important for us, my brothers, that we extenninate from our
lands this nation [England] which seeks only to destroy US.,,52 He then reminded those
assembled of the cultural obligations ofan Onontio, a duty the French recognized but
which the English viewed as the product of requests emanating from mere financial
parasites. "You see as well as I that we can no longer supply our needs, as we have done,
from our brothers, the French. The English sell us goods twice as dear as the French do,
and their goods do not last. .. and when we want to set out for our winter camps they do
not give us any credit as our brothers, the French, do.,,53 He made the insult personal by
stating, "When I go to see the English commander54 and say to him that some ofour
comrades are dead, instead ofbewailing their death, as our French brothers do, he laughs
at me and you. If I ask anything for our sick, he refuses with a reply that he has no use
for US.,,55 He then spoke of his own manipulation ofthe French to the Indi,ans' advantage
explaining that
all the nations who are our brothers attack them,-why should we not attack? Are
we not men like them... ? Do we fear that our brothers, the French, who are here
among us win prevent us? They do not know our plans and could not hinder
anyway, if they would. You all know as well as I that when the English came
upon our lands to drive out our Father, Bellestre, they took away all the
Frenchmen's guns and that they now have no arms to protect themselves with 56
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This is the context out of which the assaults inspired by Pontiac's leadership began,
culminating in what is commonly called Pontiac's War. 57
Pontiac's inspiration, however, was more successful in its outcome than the actual
events. The French plan slowly carne apart amid internal squabbles among the military
and political leaders. Commandant Louis Josep'h de Montcalm, Commander-in-Chief of
the French forces in the colonies, denounced Kerlerec's plan of guerilla warfare. He
pomnted to the problems associated with the Voyageurs and Coureurs du Bois, asserting
that the gifts required by the Indians would never reach the Natives for the skimming by
"officers, storekeepers, [and] commissaries" would "impoverish" New France. 58 The
facts bore out his fears. Unscrupulous French officials offered second rate goods to
Pontiac's Indians and pocketed the difference. Further, the supply ofgoods to the Great
Lakes region became too logistically complex after the fall of Canada and the English
control of the Saint Lawrence River. The Mississippi River was the only avenue left for
French shipments and even then the supplies had to be portaged to Detroit to reach
Pontiac. Meanwhile, Pontiac's tribes were sacking all the British forts of the
Appalachian region, taking them by trickery59 and force, Only Fort Niagara, Fort Pitt,
and Fort Detroit did not fall. British resiliency at these locales had more to do with the
Peace of Paris (1763) and the failure of French reinforcements to arrive as promised, as
opposed to Pontiac's lack oftactical skiH. 60
While Pontiac never attained ultimate victory, his actions demonstrated to the
Europeans that his Indians had the power to punish even vaunted Old World powers.
Among the Indians Pontiac's leadership was tentatively confirmed. He was articulate,
successful, and straddled spiritual and political obligations as a skilled Okama should.
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The same confirmation of his importance was also resolved in the minds ofEuropean
leaders. But where they differed was on the proper means ofhandling this prominent
chief. English traders and Indian agents wanted to utilize his position to their advantage,
creating stability in the region by reaffirming Pontiac's centrality. But British military
leaders saw the Ottawa chief as merely an obstinate warrior whose aggressiveness could
only be dealt with by punitive means .. The French assumed part ofPontiac's primacy was
due to their instigation and feared the Indians threatened any lasting peace France made
with England, so the Louisiana officials sought to placate the Algonquins only to learn
Pontiac was beyond their ability to effectively control. Pontiac was a French loyalist, but
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CHAPTER FOUR
WAKfNG UP FROM THE DREAM: THE DIPLOMATIC CENTRALITY OF
PONTIAC AMID SHIFTING EUROPEAN POLICIES
While Indian and European peoples each placed Pontiac at the center ofaffairs
during this era, efforts to neutralize the Ottawa chiefs demonstrable power still guided
crown officials' actions. France and England worked together, as the Peace ofParis
tacitly proscribed, and their efforts were consistently met with failures. It took a sertes of
blunders on the part of British military leaders to finally illustrate Pontiac's necessary
importance to create a last sense of stability in the Great Lakes region and use this fact to
their advantage. But by the time the English were ready to negotiate with the Ottawa
chief, the real source ofPontiac's prominent p,osition, his Indian supporters, were
regressing into their divisive ways. The Ottawa chiefs centrality thus waned, but was
never fully dissolved. Being a capable Okama he relied on his political cunning to retain
a small, but loyal following, and this new political direction was met by the endeavors of
British agents who finally had the opportunity to utilize Pontiac's position to their
advantage. The Europeans and the Algonquins were finally returning to at least a
diploma.tic understanding and Pontiac was the conduit for peace and stability.
As the peace agreement between France and England was finalized and the
transfer of power was slowly occurring, the French officials knew they would have
difficulty aborting the plan they had hatched with their Indian allies. The quickest
S5
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solution to expedite the process ofdemilitarization was quieting the Ottawa chief who
had the most military prowess and political capital at his disposaI. When the initial
request to hah the offensive reached Pontiac, the war chief merely responded with a
demand fOf the troops promised him by Kerlerec. While the commandant of the Illinois
district, Neyon de ViUiers, sincerely wanted to <?ontinue the operations as Kerlerec had
designed, he was under new orders. The circumstances were reminiscent of the policy
shift and subsequent turmoil that grew out orthe clashes between British policy makers
and their field agents. Jean-Jacques Blaise d' Abbadie replaced Kerlerec as Governor of
Louisiana because he was more amenable to the will of his superiors. D' Abbadie was
ignorant of the manner in which tribal diplomacy operated. Much like the British high
command, he simply assumed that his Indian allies lived at the pleasure of their French
Father. De ViIliers complained to his commander about Amherst's tardy notification of
both the cessation of hostilities and the ratification of the peace treaty because the guerllla
assaults were planned and initiated in the interim. He attempted to explain to d' Abbadie
that he was not granted adequate time to stop the campaign begun by Pontiac. Eventually
a bitter note was dispatched to Amherst stating that "I [de ViUiers] have every reason to
fear that things have been carried to the point where it will be difficult to appease them
[the Indians]." I
By this time Pontiac's followers had won virtually every engagement against the
British forces, but the fickle loyalty of the French threatened his endeavors as much as his
sieges had threatened the peace treaty. D' Abbadie ordered a recall of his troops in the
northern region and ambassadors were sent among Pontiac's coalition using "speeches,
calumets, and wampum" in an effort to restrain the Indian warriors? But a curious
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display witnessed by British officials showed, in a symbolic and cultural manner, just
what the Ottawa chief thought ofhis association with France. A meeting between
Pontiac and British officials was arranged to conduct diplomatic negotiations and was
held at the home of a Frenchman named Antoine CuiHerier. Cuillerier was the half-
brother to the old commandant ofFort DetfOtt, ~ranyois de Bellestre, whom Pontiac's
people had ousted and ridiculed during the earlier English takeover of the outpost. The
British officials took particular notice ofwhat they regarded as the insolent conduct the
Frenchman directed toward these representatives of the English crown. He was but a
common trader, possessing literally no standing among the French estabhshment, yet he
remained seated as the British delegation entered the room and kept his head "covered
during the entire Congress.,,3 The reason for this Frenchmen's lack ofdeference became
clear as the negotiations proceeded. Pontiac instructed his French associate to conduct
himself in this manner to demonstrate to the Englishmen that the Ottawa chief recognized
CuilJerier "as his Father come to life and as the commandant of Detroit untill the arrival
of his Brother [Bellestre].,,4
There was a dual political and spiritual significance in Pontiac's actions. First,
politically he was declaring that France was the only legitimate power he recognized on
Indian lands, and even then such recognition only emanated from the sovereign will of
those tribes in the Great Lakes region as expressed through their corporate leader,
Pontiac.. Second, the Ottawa Okama's phrase "Father come to life" carried with it all of
the spiritual assumptions of Algonquin culture. Cuillerier was symbolically adopted as a
replacement for his brother, Bellestre, with all of the prestige and rank earned by the
original member. De Villiers was fully cognizant of the cultural expression witnessed by
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the Engli sh officials, but he encountered little patience or understanding from his superior
when attempting to explain. 0' Abbadie dispatched a messenger to Pontiac. The envoy.
called Jordeau, stated, in dear and direct fashion to the Ottawa leader, the Europeans'
appraisal ofhis diplomatic situation by "putting three5 ofhis fingers close, Shewing him,
as the three great Kings had now made P'eace, t~at, in Attacking the English, it was
attacking the whole.,,6 Pontiac already had some knowledge ofthe Peace of Paris, but he
never accepted its validity_ He had already agreed to begin his portion ofthe Franco-
Indian offensive and the Ottawa war chiefbecame even more resolved to continue his
campaign after his initial successes. His purpose in conducting negotiations was simple
yet manipulative. If Pontiac could not induce French aid by force, perhaps he could
entice it by lure. 7
As a skillful Okama, Pontiac remained diplomatically supple in his quest for
materiel and men, so he utilized the complaints of the habitants throughout the Detroit
area to make an attempt at garnering Onontio's support. The French colonists held a
mixed feeling with regard to the behavior of their Indian neighbors, and their concerns
became acute as the campaign bogged down around the walls of the English forts.
Admittedly they were somewhat culpable for instigating the activities of the Native
coalition inasmuch as they corroborated rumors of their king's pending return. But when
French supplies were withheld-the only means of administrative control exerted over
Pontiac's war efforts-and the Natives resorted to commandeering supplies from the
French colonials, the habitants shrank from their obligations as brothers to the
Algonquins. The colonists complained to the chief that his followers would "enter [their]
homes... with the tomahawk raised as if you intend to kill us while begging for food.,,8
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They also berated Pontiac over his penchant for butchering their livestock to consume
while wasting half the carcass. They asked him, "When [the cattle] are all killed how do
you think we shall be able to plow our fields, to sow and make bread for yoU?,,9 Pontiac
cou~d not afford to lose the supplies secured from the habitants. They remained the main
source of food for his people and comprised the,only tie to Ollontio left on which he
could tug for Fran.ce's attention. As they admonished him that they were "brothers"
under the same French Father and that the "domineering" behavior on the part of his
followers would only lead to their being regarded as "rebellious children and traitors,"
Pontiac carefuUy couched his retort in a sympathetic tone. He agreed that some of his
men had taken liberties with the colonists' possessions, but he also asserted the reverse
was true. He reiterated, staying true to the religious parameters defining his activities,
that "it is not for personal vengeance that I am making war upon the English," Rather,
Pontiac pointed to the "insults" the English had leveled at the Indians in council s, the
reality that the British military authorities disarmed the hahitant~.., and that he al.one stood
as the sole counterbalance to English domination in the absence of 011011/io. Pontiac
reminded them of the protection he had offered during assaults by the Sac and Fox
earlier. Further, he too used the fear ofa returning French Father in declaring that he
knew some of the settlers secretly desired Engl ish rule, working to have it come to
fruition, and that the identities of those individuals whose loyalty was in doubt would be
given to Onontio. He stated flatly that he did "not demand your [habitant] assistance,
because [he knew they] could not give i1.,,10 He asked only for "provisions for myself
and my followers."ll But throughout his discussion with the habitants, Pontiac began
lacing in subtle political ploys in an attempt to instigate OnOl11io '.'I reactions. 12
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If French aid would not come to the Indians, perhaps aid would ,come to French
colonists, the practical result of which would be the funneling of supplies to those Indians
laying siege to English forts. Pontiac told the habitants: "I am French, and I want to die
French, and I repeat that it is altogether your interests and mine that I avenge."J3 In
comparing their experience and loyalty, Pontiac, next attempted to link their future. After
admitting that he could not demand the colonials' assistance, he did state coyly if they
would offer such military service he "would not refuse" and that such a concerted effort
would "get out the trouble quicker." 14 The habitants relented with considerable
trepidation. The Ottawa chief assumed a continued show of military prowess would keep
him central to Euro-Indian affairs. 15
Evidence of this plan by Pontiac to entice his French Father's return is most
clearly seen in two letters dispatched from Detroit--one :from French colonists, the other
from Pontiac himself. The note from the habitants speaks to their being placed in the
middle of the diplomatic interplay between Pontiac and the French governor, Jean-
Jacques d' Abbadie. They wrote to the governor that they were "obliged to submit to
what the Indians exact[ed]. .. the English are blocked up, and all the passages are shut
Up.,,16 Adding that the situation created great "perplexity" within them, they asked their
leaders to come see "with their own eyes what was going on" and that it seemed as if
"God alone can prevent our becoming the victims of the English and savages.,,1?
Pontiac's letter to Governor d'Abbadie contained the same artful rhetoric he used
against the habitants. Addressing it to feHow"prisoners" of the English, the Ottawa chief
stated from the outset he was willing to "adopt" the English "as brethren" should they not
"deceive so many nations." 18 Gratitude was also extended to his French neighbors so that
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Onontio might see Pontiac's loyalty. He stated sincerely "without the help ofthe French
merchants who gave us credit and without some small reserves which we bad for buying
our fall needs, we would have been lost,,19 But Pontiac repeatedly feigned ignorance as
to the reason why his French Father was not writing him. He stated that he could not
believe the English decIaration that they were "f:Ilasters ofall these lands that belonged to
your father, for we have conquered him.,,2o Reminding the French leaders of Indian
sovereignty in the affairs of state, Pontiac then spoke of the Lenapes initiating the anti-
British sentiment, which in turn comprised the exclusionary and visionary foundation
upon which he conducted his activities. He even offered a remark given him by the
Lenapes as evidence. With regard to their fear that the British intended to kill all of the
Natives, the Lenapes told the Ottawas «<let us die together, since the design of the
English is to destroy us. We are dead one way or another.",21 Pontiac asserted that it
was then that the Indians decided "to fall in here at Detroit" and Bellestre's parting words
that "the English today overthrow your father. As long as they have the upper hand you
will not have what you stand in need of; but this will not last," only put the French and
Indians in common cause. 22 Pontiac closed his letter to Onontio by explaining the reason
for his activities. It was because "we [the Indians] do not want the English to hold these
lands, this is what causes your children to rise and strike everywhere.'>23 In this
statement, d'Abbadie heard why his messengers were ignored and informed why the
Indian attacks erupted and would continue until Pontiac deci ded they were over. The
French Father's presence was being summoned back into the region he abandoned by the
very people he had surrendered to the whims of his British adversaries. The enticement
had no effect, but Pontiac continued in his Francophile ways. 24
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Though the French and English officials were attempting to isolate Pontiac and
bring hirninto subjection, their efforts had no effect until the habitants finally withdrew
their direct support. The Ottawa war chiefgrew impatient as 012ontio tamed and French
informants throughout the region betrayed the Indians' tactical efforts. His solution was
to make the French colonials "by force or fiienqship ... take up hostilities. ,,25 Pontiac
summoned the heads of French families and accused them of"abetting [the English] to
our hurt.,,26 He intoned the will of the Master ofLife with regard to the divine command
to drive the English from the region to sanctify his harder line. Pontiac then concluded
his tirade with an ultimatum, demanding the habitants "either remain French as we [the
Indians] are, or altogether English as they are. ,,27 A spokesman for the colonists
responded to the Okama saying Pontiac, ifhe could, "must remove ... the bonds which tie
our hands and which the Father of the French and the Father ofthe English have knotted
about us as the only hindrance to ... accepting [pontiac'S] war-belt.,,28 To these French
settlers, their hearts were with the Francophile Indians, but their minds were reconciling
the reality of Britain's victory. There was a distinct difference in motivations between
those ofPontiac's Indians and those of the habitants. The former were fighting for
homeland, ideology, and even spirituality. The latter might be fighting for homes and
family, but those possessions would easily survive a change in authority and bureaucracy
if they proved themselves docile subjects. What they needed from Pontiac was some
assurance that if they followed his aggressive lead a reward awaited them regardless of
outcome. Pontiac could not offer such a promise. Consequently the habitants produced a
document from their king ordering his subjects to "remain quiet in [their] houses, for he
alone wishes to deliver [themJ,',29 They reminded Pontiac that he, too, had promised to
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wait for Onontio 's return. But the Ottawa was still bent oOn precipitating that
development. Furthermore, Pontiac was, by virtue of Neolin' s vision, the deliverer of his
people, noOt Ollontio. The French colonials were awaiting the return of their own leader
whom they believed just as sincerely would "when he comes... deliver US.,,3G
Pontiac's siege, and thereby his powerful position, was virtually undermined by
the neutrality of the habitants. The most the Ottawa leader could glean from his French
neighbors was a "vagabond" lot oOfyoung, single men who vowed allegiance to the Indian
leader because they had nothing at risk. 31 The remaining colonists were "very much
grieved" by their pugnacious countrymen.32 Pontiac held no ill will toward the neutrals;
he shook their hands as they retired from his council. But the habitants were "filled with
anger" at the force Pontiac displayed and their malice toward those French who sided
with the Indians was apparent to all, even prompting the Frenchmen to remain with their
Native associates because no colonist "would receive them into his home. ,,33 As the
tension lingered and Pontiac tried to figure out what he was going to do to entice
Onontio 's renewed presence the father ofone of the Frenchmen who joined Pontiac
approached the chief to obtain his son's safe return. He confronted the chief boldly
asking, "Have you lost your mind? Why [use] ... young men who have no sense and who
are going to come here in tears to deny what they have said? They will kill thee
perhaps. ,,34 The inexperience of many of the French who joined with Pontiac was
obviously a concern to both those families who loved them as well as to a war chief who
needed hardened soldiers to launch any worthwhile assault upon the English. Pontiac
never assessed his new troops' abilities and the concern in this regard was shown in his
response to the habitant father. The Okama <4listen[ed] very attentively to what the
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Frenchman had just told him. 'Thou art right, my brother: he replied, 'and I thank thee
for the warning thou hast given me. ",3.5 Pontiac ordered the young habitants to their
homes and never again pressed the French colonials to become involved.36
The siege inevitably had negative effects on Pontiac's Indian coalition members
as he struggled to maintain his centrality. Through the year-long stalemate, Pontiac's
followers reverted to the comfortable factions and behaviors that had divided them prior
to Neolin's unifying vision as tangible successes were no longer Corthcoming, and
Pontiac as a "chosen" leader was corning into question. Shipments of brandy and rum
were seized amongst the supplies meant for the forts. Though the Master ofLife forbade
excessive consumption of alcohol, many Natives found an outlet for pent up boredom in
drunken binges. Too often reckless aggression accompanied the spirits. Many of the
people under Pontiac's command engaged in tribal brawls while inebriated and still
others resorted to attacking French and English settlers, even murdering prisoners
retained for ransom and bargain. 37
Pontiac attempted to handle each ofthese developments as they occurred, but at
times his hypocrisy was exposed. One such incident involved the Ojibway chief,
Kinonchamek, who came down to Detroit from northern Michigan to address the
coalition tribes meeting with the Ottawa leader. After capturing the English fort at
Michilimackinac, Pontiac demanded and received the captives taken by Kinoncharnek's
men and turned them over to Onontio at Quebec in an effort to forestall any reprisals.
Pontiac had not ordered the assault, therefore, he did not want any unwarranted blame
heaped upon him. Kinonchamek brought his loyalty in this matter to Pontiac's attention
to lend some cultural legitimacy to his verbal upbraiding of the Ottawa leader. The
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Ojibway accused Pontiac before the members of the council of ignoring the commands of
the Master ofLife, assaulting the French habitants, and even murdering British prisoners.
He told Pontiac that his actions were putting the Indians «in danger of incurring the
reproaches of our Great Father when he shaH come.,,38 Rightly rebuked, Pontiac
appeared "in the face of this speech... like a child surprised in some fault with no excuse
to give, and he did not know what to say.,,39 The council ended and Pontiac was aware
that he was steadily allowing temporal, political debates to draw him into their tangles.
The further he drifted from the spiritual nature ofhis mission, the deeper the factions
among his followers grew. Following the heavy casualties taken in the Battle of Bloody
Run near Fort Detroit, the Battle ofBushy Run near Fort Pitt, and a failed assault on a
sloop, the Michigan, along the Detroit River, many of the tribes under Pontiac's sway
hinted that they were going to seek terms for a separate peace. French apathy, British
hostility, and Indian disharmony surrounded the Ottawa chief personally much like he
had done to the fort at Detroit. Futility was the most difficult lesson for Pontiac to
internalize on a personal level, but as an Okama he had always sought out and acted in
the best interests of his people when those interests became clear to him. 40
The turmoil ,experienced by Pontiac's coalition prompted many of its members to
seek out the Ottawa chief for answers, which served to keep him central to the transfer of
territorial claims between the French and English because it kept his number of
supporters high, thus his military threat and political vitality high. Pontiac, aware of the
realities involved, sent a message of his own to the commander of Fort Detroit, Major
Henry Galdwin, with the duties of an Okama informing his thoughts as wert as his




The word which my father has sent me to make peace I have accepted; all my
young men have buried their hatchets. I think you will forget the bad things
which have taken place for some time past. Likewise I shall forget what you may
have done to me, in order to think ofnothing but good. I, the Chippewas, the
Hurons, we are ready to speak with you when you ask us. Give us an answer. I
am sending this resolution to you in order that you may see it. If you are as kind
as I, you will make me a reply. I wish you a good day.
Pontiac. 41
The Ottawa leader was bound to care for his people and respect their wishes; at
prolongation of conflict was simply too much to demand ofhis followers for they would
surely leave him. An Okama did not enjoy the luxury of those coercive tools necessary
to make them stay. Gladwin responded to Pontiac that he did not have the authority to
discuss peace with the Indians and that he would have to wait for Lord Amherst to
present the Natives with England's terms of reconciliation. The commander knew he had
the advantage given Pontiac's internal woes. The Ottawa chief quickly surmised this and
balked at Gladwin's invitation to wait. Instead, Pontiac took what remained ofhis
followers and headed south to establish residence along the banks ofthe Maumee River
near the pr,esent-day city ofToledo, Ohio.42
What occurred during those events which can properly be called Pontiac's War
comprised more than a simple military defeat~--rather it can be more accurately described
as a literal loss of faith in the Okama's leadership. In narrow, tribal terms an Okama is
supposed to display capability in battle as well as provide sustenance for his people.
Pontiac enjoyed such a charismatic appeal until the offensive stalled around the European
strongholds. The Indians had not experienced this style of combat before and had not yet
developed any dependable manner in which to challenge these obstacles. Furthermore, as
the sources of supply were reduced, Pontiac no longer had the capacity to provide for his
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followers and his status as Okama thus came under close scrutiny from within. But on a
larger, pan-tribal scale Pontiac's legitimacy for leading the coalition was called into
question by virtue of the lack of the phenomenological elements promised within the
vision he utilized. lfthe Master of Life had spoken to the Ottawa chief, he was obliged to
demonstrate the validity of his claims by fulfilli~g the prophecy. Pontiac was committed,
spiritually and politically, to drive the English from Indian lands as well as prot,ect Native
adherents from any temporal harms that might befall them. With Pontiac stymied around
forts Pitt, Niagara, and Detroit, his followers began to question whether there truly was
any sacred power behind his leadership. Heavy casualties, and Amherst's subsequent
spread of smallpox through infested blankets placed among those tribes involved in the
sieges, only gave credence to doubts regarding Pontiac's heavenly mandate.43
Despite Pontiac's waning status, the political affairs that embroiled him were
enough to keep him central to any diplomatic solutions concocted by European power
brokers. The lifting of the sieges brought with it the end of the silence Onontio practiced
with regard to his Algonquin children. Neyon de ViHiers was granted permission to
summon Pontiac for talks at Fort de Chartres in the Illinois Territory still controlled by
the French. The Ottawa had taken to hunting in the west foHowing his relocation along
the Maumee because of the quantity of game, the unwavering allegiance of the Illinois
Indians, and the presence of Ottawa relatives intermarried with the Illinois tribes. Pontiac
and de Villiers met only once. Their brief conversation was filled with tension and threat
as the French continued to try and assuage any concerns the AJgonquins had over the
transfer of Onontio status to the English. Asserting that he "speaks for all" the Indians,
Pontiac asked for the French king to "take pity on us. We hope that the Master of Life
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will inspire him with something favorable for us. Ifom prayers our fulfilled, we hope to
see again ... Bellestre.,,44 Pontiac continued by stating that the English were "liars" and
that his people would rather "die slaves or at the foot of the tress for want of succor" than
suffer the English among them. 45 A promise was given to the French that the Indians
would restore their power and prestige if only they could depend upon goods and
munitions. Pontiac closed his appeal with a final attempt to stay on what little common
spiritual ground remained to him. He declared that the Master ofLife "put arms in our
hands, and it is he who has ordered us to fight against this bad meat that would come and
infest our lands.,,46 Again, the sovereignty of Indian action as well as their desire for
Onol1tio 's return was asserted. The Ottawa chief added that "if I was the first Red Man
that held this opinion thou might say Pontiack is a liar but... all the nations of the
Continent hold this discourse.... Think then my Father that thou goest against the orders
of the Master ofLife & that aU the r,ed Men conform to his will, Thus I pray thee to talk
no more ofa Peaoe with the English, because I hate them.,,47 De Villiers's response was
predictable. Pontiac interrupted his words regarding peace with the English, reiterating
his hatred for the English. De Villiers defiantly finished his comments concerning the
peace pact between the Europeans. Pontiac ended the council by offering a veiled threat
which was merely a simple truth regarding those events that lay ahead. The Ottawa war
chief stated, "Be easy, my father, I will not spill blood upon thy tands. What I will spill
shaH be upon the water of thy river, which the current will wash away.,,48 The
implication here was that the fight around Detroit was over, but a renewal ofhostilities
would naturally progress from the British forces moving westward toward the Mississippi
River which the French still controlled. De Villiers wanted to continue the talks after
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Pontiac calmed down, but the Ottawa chiefdid not accept his invitation and returned to
his home in the Ohio country. He circulated new war belts among the:.tribe&-m the·Ohio
Valley as well as those in the minois Territory. But certain developments arising from
additional British policy shifts and unhappy coalition members quickly undercut
Pontiac's ambition to entice Onontio's retum.49
Two opposing factors shaped British policy: Lord Jeffrey Amherst's desire to
punish the Indian nations and the reality that the losses incurred during Pontiac's War
prevented him from fulfilling that desire. Amherst was being rotated out ofNorth
America and back to England for a period oftime in 1764. Before his departure he told
his replacement, Thomas Gage, "1 am determined to go through with it in such a manner
that the whole race ofIndians who have any connection with the English may see the
folly and madness, as well as the ingratitude of setting themselves in opposition to a
people from whom they have received so many benefits. ,,50 Gage agreed in spirit with
his outgoing commander. He formally asked Henry Bouquet twice to create a list of
"Promoters ofthe War" which he wanted to see "put to death.',5! Chief among those on
this list were Pontiac and Neolin. 52
A punitive expedition was sent west led by Colonel John Bradstreet, himself an
Indian foe albeit less rancorous. 53 He vowed to have Pontiac "be given up to be sent
down to the country and maintained at His Majesty's expense the remainder of his
days.',54 Cans for recruits were sent out to several colonial governments including New
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, but the heavy losses incurred throughout the Indian
wars, particularly after the defeat at Bloody Run and the pyrrhic victory at Bushy Run,
resulted in steep demands. The colonies allocated resources and mustered what they
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could, but Bradstreet admitted even "mf the whole were oftbe best Troops his Majesty
has, the Number is far from being equal to [the] Service.n55 Consequently, Bradstreet's
mission to capture and kill as many ofPontiac's warriors as possible turned into a treaty
campaign wherein the colonel sought to neutralize as many tribes as he could still under
the Ottawa chiefs sway. 56
The piecemeal attempt to whittle away at the Indian coaJition made many English
bureaucrats feel as if they were accomplishing their goal ofestablishing hegemony, but
Pontiac's allegiance among the western tribes remained strong as British policy broke
into the familiar schism between military officials and Indian agents. Bradstreet reached
the vicinity of Detroit and was forced to divide his troops among the two main forts of
the Michigan Territory, Detroit and Michilimackinac, to retain British control and
emanate royal power from these locales. But the thin dispersal of soldiers, coupled with
Bradstreet's own timidity in the field, prompted the English official to seek out the
individual Indian nations for treaties. Many conferences were held throughout the region,
most notably at Presque Isle and Detroit, where the devious colonel convinced many of
the Great Lakes peoples to surrender their prisoners, cede their land, and recognize that
King George had the "sole right of sover,eignty over aU and every part ofthis country. ,,57
Upon hearing the news of the peace treaties negotiated by Bradstreet, Thomas Gage was
outraged. Bradstreet had disobeyed his orders as well as showed a flagrant disregard for
administrative protocol. No formal transfer of official powers occurred between Amherst
and Gage because the former had expected to return shortly. So, the only British official
with the power to draft and sign binding agreements between the Indian nations and the




for his part, tried to finesse the issue to draw Gage into a more affable mood, hoping that
the general would anow him to do what Amherst would not: negotiate a meaningful
peace with Pontiac on Indian tenns. Privately Johnson said ofBradstreet's treaty, "I
dread its consequences, as I recoUect that some attempts toward Sovereignty [over the
Indians] not long ago was one of the principal causes ofall our troubles."S8 But fonnaBy
the Indian Superintendent blamed some ofthe terms on "the Ignorance oftne Interpreter
or from some other mistake. ,,59 Johnson told Gage that the Indians could "never mean or
intend... [to] be brought under our Laws... nor would they convey the most distant idea of
subjection.,,60 If the plan went through Johnson feared that it would "produce infinite
harm" for the Algonquins could be "very dangerous neighbors.,,61
Gage retained confidence in his subordinate's abilities in the field at least briefly
and allowed Bradstreet to renew his campaign to punish Pontiac's followers, but the
cotonel returned such faith with continued incompetence and entrenching Pontiac in his
loyalty to the French. Bradstreet meandered throughout the Great Lakes region in a vain
and comical attempt to find the promoters ofwar among the tribes he encountered.
Eventually, his travels plunged him deep into the forests and waters ofMichigan which
he could not navigate. He returned to Detroit and dispatched Captain Thomas Morris
with a sroan detachment of troops and two French guides in an effort to find Pontiac.
While Morris was unable to find the Ottawa chief, Pontiac did find the captain. The
Indian warriors surrounded the British squad where they meant to kill the interlopers;
only the sight ofFrenchmen among the red coats gave Pontiac pause and eventually led




The captain's account of what he saw was full of the same symbolic significance
witnessed'by the British negotiators at Fort Detroit during the siege of 1763. Morris was
"astonished to see a great number of white flags flying," which did not constitute banners
of surrender but were rather representations of the drapeau blanc of the French military.63
Pontiac had commented to French officials bef~re that his people's "hearts wiU be sore so
long as we see the Red Flag [ofEngland] over our land-we who have always loved the
White [ofFrance].,,64 During the meeting, Morris witnessed Pontiac in command of a
cadre of European aides-de-camp, most prominent among them was one caned Jacques
St. Vincent who "by his dress and air" the British captain believed was a French officer.6~
As the meeting progressed it was appar,ent that the Frenchman was the new surrogate for
Onontio following Antoine Cullierer's departure.66 Throughout the cordial meeting St.
Vincent constantly remained at a subordinat,e position relative to Pontiac, speaking to the
continued belief of the sovereignty of Indian nations in the Ottawa's mind and the fact
that the French king did not dominate them as the English king desired to dO.67
Morris stayed with Pontiac for a few days then returned with word to Bradstreet
that the Ottawa remained a French ally, but, contrary to British perception, he was "quite
tractable.,,68 The Ottawa chief told Morris, "I will lead the nations to war no more; let
'em be at peace, if they chuse it: but I myself will never be a friend to the English. I
shall now become a wanderer in the woods; and if they come to seek me there, while I
have an arrow left, I will shoot at them.,,6<.l But, the captain added, "people driven to
despair are capable ofeverything and that by leaving room for repentance we often make
a zealous Friend ofan inveterate enemy.,,70 His point was self-evident; he had stayed
among Pontiac's inner circle and received the chiefs personal protection.71
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Another symbolic act on the part ofPontiac's spiritual advisor, Katapelleecy, also
provided Morris with justification for this belief The Ottawa leader spoke to the English
captain saying that he did not dream anything negative concerning the soldier's intentions
since his arrival at the Indian settlement. Katapelleecy warned him that had his steep
been anything but restful, Morris would be dead. The Ottawa then departed. and returned
"dressed in a lace scarlet coat with blue cuffs, and a laced hat."n Morris "wondered
more at the colour of the cloaths than at the finery; and was told that it was a present
from... Sir William Johnson."?] KatapeHeecy had conducted the superintendent to his
initial meetings with Pontiac at Detroit during the process of the English takeover of the
fort?4
Following this display, the Ottawa leader stated flatly that "the English were
liars" but he asked whether Morris's desire for peace was sincere, requiring a
demonstration of such good intentions by a promise of gifts of clothing for Pontiac's
Indians. 75 Moms assured KatapeHeecy as well as Pontiac that his intentions were noble
and that the English sought only harmony with their former adversaries. The
demonstration was clear to Captain Morris. Pontiac trusted Johnson by virtue of his
respectful actions and observance of Indian protocol in the practice of gift giving, but the
chief did not hold such faith in the English establishment. As an Okama, Pontiac was
obliged to act in the best interest:s of his people, thus this demonstration ofhis willingness
to work out an agreement with the one trustworthy official he encountered, Sir William
Jlohnson. But personally, Pontiac was not obliged to mind any such democratic notions.
He was and would remain a French loyalist. His recalcitrance stood in direct correlation
to that ofEngland's. Morris tacitly agreed with Johnson that «Pondiac might be made a
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faithful Subject of the Kjng ofEngland and become of infinite Service" should the
English administration see fit to extend to him their hand in friendship. The captain
returned to Detroit with a belt of peace offered by Pontiac to Bradstreet as confirmation
of Morris's evaluation. 76
With this assessment ofPontiac's tempe~amentas wen as the chiefs noble
offering, Bradstreet, while in council with other Indian chiefs, proceeded to deliver a
monumental affront to Native sensibilities. He picked up a hatchet, carved the belt of
peace into bits, then cast its remnants into the. Detroit River. The Indians present viewed
the colonel's actions coolly. Pontiac eventually heard ofBradstreet's insult and
immediately stitched together an even larger war-belt than the one he had circulated at
the outset of his call for Indian unity. This new belt, over six feet in length, rekindled the
Indians' determination to oust the British from their lands and was circulated through the
tribes in the Illinois Territory. 77
Evidence of the chaos Bradstreet had created surrounded every council where he
was present. The old intertribal rivalries and intratribal factions resulted in the violence
familiar among the Great Lakes people before they fell under Neolin's unifying theology.
The affair culminated in a ghastly incident nearly impossible for British diplomats to
gloss over or traditional Indians to try to comprehend. Two rival chiefs argued so bitterly
in front of the English commander that their quarrel caused each to draw a knife after
which they "stabb'd each other, in such a manner that their Lives are despaired of.,,78
Bradstreet was causing immense problems while still not fulfilling his assigned duties?)
Thomas Gage was clearly lost as to how to reconcile Captain John Bradstreet's
incompetence, Pontiac's contentious mood, and Sir WiUiam Johnson's knowing
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commentary. The commander finally let Johnson send his subordinates west in an
attempt to bring order to the chaos Bradstreet created, and the man they focused upon
was Pontiac. Gage said ofPontiac he was "not only ... a Savage, possessed of the most
refined Cunning and treachery ... but a person of extraordinary Abilities. Pontiac keeps
two Secretaries, one to write for him, and the other to read the letters he receives, & he
manages them so, as to keep each of them ignorant of what is transacted by the other.,,80
He has maintained "as much influence as ever" over the tribes and could "manage them
as he pleases. ,,81 [n short, "Pondiac should, if possible, be gained to our interest. ,,82
Johnson agreed saying "this fellow shou'd be gained to our Interest or knocked in the
head. He has great Abilities, but his Savage Cruelty destroys the regard we should
otherwise have for him. ,,83
Each now acknowledged Pontiac's centrality, although late in the affair, and
planned to co-opt the Ottawa chief to serve the crown's interests seeing that the leader
could not be effectively neutralized through combat. George Croghan was immediately
dispatched and his earlier appraisal that the Indians believed "the French had no Right to
give away their Country; as, they Say, they were never Conquered by any Nation" guided
his endeavors.84 The trader was an old, tmsted friend of Pontiac and he knew the
Ottawa's spirit. He noted that Pontiac "commands more respect among those Nations (in
IUinois), than any Indian I ever saw could do amongst his own Tribe.,,8:5 He wanted
desperately to find Pontiac fast before the dire circumstances worsened, for the Indians he
encountered now "preferred dying to making peace with the British."86 The entire
situation was reminiscent of the French who tried to curtail Pontiac's activities. The
failure to recognize the Ottawa chief as a guarantor of peace and stability was the reason
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all of the conflicting parties found themselves in this diplomatic morass. What Johnson
and Croghan did not know, though, was that forces outside their control were conspiring
against their desire to accept Pontiac's centrality and finaUy use it to their advantage. 87
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION-LONELIER THAN GOD: POST-WAR FACTIONALISM AND
PONTIAC'S DEMISE
Sir William Johnson intended to use the Algonquins as administrators ofEnglish
will in the west just as the Iroquois Lea!,lUe had been used for the same purpose in the
east, but this triggered the first of three dynamics working against the broad appeal of
Pontiac. Johnson und,erestimated the indignation of the Iroquois as a result of this plan to
establish favorable relations with their Algonquin enemies. Under Johnson, British laws
had been enforced utilizing the Iroquois League as policemen. Being the largest
confederacy oftribes in the region they wielded the greatest military power and thus
commanded the greatest respect among the numerous peoples of the northeast. The tribal
members were eventually steered into supporting their British comrades by a
combination of events and the work of Sir William Johnson during the Seven Years' War
and the resultant treaties at Niagara between the Senecas, Lenapes, Shawnees, and the
British Crown were attributable to the combined use ofBritish graciousness and lroquois
threat. The Senecas had previously broken away from their fellow Iroquois to side with
Pontiac's efforts in addressing English encroachment. But after Pontiac's sieges were
lifted, Johnson treated with the Senecas and found them quite amicable as the other
Iroquois members threatened reprisals as a consequence of insubordination in tribal
secession. But now the reconstituted League, continuing as Johnson's enforcers, took as
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an insult the plan to establish a simi~ar system in the western Great Lakes under Pontiac's
Algonquins, as he had done successfully with the Iroquois in the eastern lands. Johnson
was forced to soothe the Iroquois' sensitive egos, costing him valuable time and presents,
just to keep the s~tuation in the New York region from erupting as it had in the Ohio
Valley.l
The second internal factor working against Pontiac's retarning control of a unified
Indian front was most critical since it tore away the spiritual foundation of his ascens~on.
In 1765 Neolin approached George Croghan and said the Master ofLife had visited the
Lenape prophet again, giving a new direction to his Indian children. Whether the prophet
meant the Indians strayed from the Great Spirit's plan and were being forced to suffer the
ramifications of sin by accommodating the British or the new vision was merely a
refinement of the old based upon Pontiac's inability to attain a decisive victory is unclear.
What is evident from the Lenape's words, though, is that Christian missionaries were
finally having an influence upon the Native prophet's soul. Neolin told Croghan "our
Great Father (God] allows us to know his will and in what manner we ought to proceed in
order to make a firm and lasting Friendship between one another, and the persons
amongst the White people to whom we are to Speak to on this head, by order of our
Father, are the Quakers.,,2 Again, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity ofNeolin's
vision because the statement speaks directly from Lenape triba' experiences. The prophet
began expressing considerable interest in the Christian religion at this time, especially to
Quaker missionaries, as a result of his self-described spiritual growth. The Quakers'
theology had a phenomenological element ingrained in its practice so Neolin and the
missionaries were finding many religious commonalties through which to communicate.
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Clearly Neolin was becoming more engrossed with heavenly affairs than mundane
concerns. Furthermore, the Society ofFriends demonstrated their kindness toward the
Indians of the Pennsylvania region during the rampage of the Paxton Boys,} harboring
defenseless Natives who ran from the onslaught ofEnglish colonial rage. Hearkening
back to when Neolin first provided his vision as, a sort of reforma6on of Lenape theology,
the prophet's new message also bore distinct parallels with that of Papounhan and his
syncretism of Christian and Algonquin beliefs. The old tribal divisions were reemerging
as the theology Neolin fostered gave up on its leader who had likewise lost his potitical
focus. The temporal struggles led Pontiac astray and consumed his spiritual foundation
as well as his diplomatic patience.4
This interpretation of a renewal of old tribal tensions between accommodation
and tradition is given further validity in the final dynamic working against Johnson's
desire to seize upon Pontiac's ascended state, that being a resolute nativist rival to the
Ottawa chief named Charlot Kaske. Like Papounhan's theological compliment before
the rise of Pontiac, Kaske appears quite similar to the Lenape nativist Wangomen. Kaske
was himself a living contradiction and contested with his opponent for Indian favor. The
son ofa German father and Shawnee mother, Kaske was raised as a Catholic Indian,
married to an English captive, and was more stridently opposed to a British presence
upon the North American continent than Pontiac was at this juncture. Certainly, Pontiac
had not evolved into anything close to the accommodating stance ofNeolin, but neither
was Pontiac willing to instigate a fight with the English crown as Kaske was. The
Ottawa chief was aware that his efforts reduced England's ability to launch any major
offensive and secured for him valuable diplomatic room within which he could continue
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to negotiate an acceptable political settlement, even if his spiritual luster was diminishing.
So, the Ottawa Okama found himself remaining in the center ofdiplomatic and cultural
affairs as a result ofthe circumstances shifting around him. Lord Jeffrey Amherst and Sir
WiUiam Johnson served as contrasts within the crown's approach in handling Indian
affairs. Kaske and Neolin mirrored the English policy makers by polarizing the Indian
coalition over how to handle European relations. And Pontiac, despite his former
militancy and continued personal aversion toward the British, became the appointed
intercessor between all these disputing parties. The remnants of the Ottawa chief's
prestige were still enough to reconstruct at least a tenuous version of the old covenant
chain. 5
The French, whose Louisiana Territory Charles Philippe Aubry now governed,
were aware of Pontiac's hospitable mood and attempted to assist the British
representative, George Croghan, in his efforts to speak to the Ottawa chief. They
corrected the false English perception ofKaske being a minion ofPontiac, ignored the
Shawnee nativist's demands for supplies, and instead asked both Croghan and Pontiac to
come to Fort de Chartr,es to begin talks for a formal peace. Besides, his friends, de
ViHiers and Croghan, were the officials who requested his presence. Plus, French
officials were shoving Kaske away in New Orleans while Pontiac was being drawn closer
into Ononlio's favor. AU of this prompted Pontiac to accept the invitation.6
A potentially disastrous incident prior to the convention at Fort de Chartres
illustrates Pontiac's continued prominence and is indicative of his remaining status.
Lieutenant Alexander Fraser, an English officer, was detached from his post at Fort Pitt
to link up with Croghan in the Illinois Territory in order to provide the agent with a
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military escort along his journey. Fraser, in advised, left too early. Whiie near his
destination ofFort de Chartres, Pontiac and a band of his fonowers confronted the
lieutenant's men and purportedly wanted to seize them as captives. But during their
subsequent talk at the fort, Pontiac explained to the Englishman his perception was "not
to be viewed as [Fraser) supposed" and that his .men onJyacted with the "good motive" of
protecting the officer "from accident, because being with me [pontiac] he would be
insulted by no one."? Pontiac's words were true. Kaske was aware of the approach of
the English emissaries and had spies looking for Fraser and Croghan so that he might
seize them and use them for bargaining purposes. Pontiac was winning the trust of the
European representatives and was also hoping to retain much ofthe prestige that was
being taken from him by Kaske's more extreme positions. And maintaining an open
dialog between he and the European officials kept French and English attention on the
Ottawa chief and held the interest of the Indians by offering them a choice in leadership. II
At the conference, Pontiac tentatively accepted a peace-belt offered him by Fraser
on behalf of Johnson, mainly because the Lenapes, eastern Shawnees, and reconstituted
Iroquois had already agreed to peace. He also found solace in the revived good graces of
his French Father. Pontiac stated his belief that the French governor "restored peace to
all these children [the Indians and Englishl,,9 He added that "for the future we will
regard the English as brothers, since you [his French Father] wish to make us all one.,,10
He then aocepted another invitation to return to the fort and meet with George Croghan. 11
Fraser received confirmation ofPontiac's continued influence from some Illinois tribes
with whom the Ottawa enjoyed some influence. Pontiac dispatched belts of peace to
enlist the tribes in a "common cause" to work out a settlement with the British in the
90
Pontiac was now completely immersed in the political circumstance ofhis era and
was transformed into an advocate for British occupation. Johnson was aware that
Pontiac's influence had a direct correlation to those «favours" and "honours" which the
Okama could spread among his people. IS Supplies ofboth good quality and quantity
were transferred to the Ottawa chief so that he might fulfill his reciprocal obfigat'ons.
Johnson even contribut,ed to the Okama's status by utilizing the French custom of
bestowing medals upon the chief with whom the Crown's favor rested. These tribal
leaders adorned themselves with these symbols of friendship and used them for
charismatic and political purposes. Finally, Pontiac received a payment of ten shillings
per day for his services to the Crown, a sum equivalent to that ofa captain in the British
regular army. 19
The Ottawa chief s powerful position was not only apparent in financial
transactions but also in sensitive legal matters of the post-war era. The killing ofa seven-
year-old girl, Betty Fisher, pitted the English administration against the French Cuillerier
family and their son, AJexis Cui11erier, who stood accused of the crime. 2o Pontiac was
placed at the center of the controversy because the Frenchmen was a partisan of the
Ottawa chief and claimed that he was only foHowing Pontiac's orders in drowning the
little girl in the Maumee River. A summons was presented to Pontiac and he testified
through his interpreter. The English ,examiner, Jehu Hay, reminded Pontiac during the
questioning' that all wartime actions were excused and that if he committed the murder he
was not accountable. Realizing this, Pontiac tailored his testimony to coincide with that
of the Frenchman's in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty to Onontio's fenow children.
But the chiefs interpr<eter as well as a group ofEnglish eyewitnesses told Hay that
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Pontiac's original testimony, that Alexis Cuillerier drowned the child for unknown
reasons, was the accurate version ofevents. The English examiner believed them and
wanted the interpreter to remain at the fort until crown officials could conduct a formal
trial and sentencing so that he could testify. The Indian interpreter did not want to stay
and when British authorities attempted to confine him he escaped into the Illinois
Territory. When asked if he knew ofms former interpreter's whereabouts, Pontiac stated
that he did not. Hay believed that the interpreter's flight had to do with a threat from the
Cuillerier family and became more detennined to see the Frenchman prosecuted. Clearly
this event shows Pontiac's diplomatic importance to the English. They were prepared to
ignore an act of murder even if the chief admitted it. The life of Alexis Cuillerier was,
from the outset of the investigation, inconsequential so long as British policy moved
ahead as planned. And when Cuillerier's main accuser ran from his obligation to testify,
the British officials merely shifted the responsibility for the act over to the Crown's
French scapegoat. Nothing was to alter England's designed use ofPontiac's prominence
to aid their desire to control the Great Lakes region. 21
When the time came for Pontiac to acquiesce to British authority fonnally and
offer Johnson the Onontio status he coveted, the Ottawa chief spoke the proper words,
but his support of the policy had as much to do with his own frustration as it had to do
with his genuine affinity for Croghan or Johnson. He explained, "1 have no complaint
whatever against the English," rather it was his own "young men who have shamed
me.,,22 Fellow Ottawas wer,e then berated. «It is solely against my own nation that I am
offended, by the several insults they have made me, saying that I was never chief. I have
replied to them, 'You are chiefs like me; make arrangements to command the village. As
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for me, I am leaving it. ",23 This sarcastic remark was due to developments during the
period of Pontiac's waning charisma. Chalot Kaske's extreme rhetoric was pamting the
Ottawa chief as an imposter turned traitor. Several times Pontiac's own Ottawas beat
him to the ground, even prompting Croghan to record that the "Indians are very jealous of
pondiac & want to Chuse another Chief they think we make to much ofhim.,,24 Pontiac
explained that he was retiring to the minois country near his French Father as well as his
Indian relatives. He assured Johnson that he would "always hold fast to your [Johnson's]
hand...which I have accepted and which is proof that I have never acted to perpetrate any
bad affairs.,,25 The Okama related that his words and promises were binding for him as
wen as for Johnson because of their mutual acceptance of"a belt and twist oftobacco.,,26
Pontiac h~d her'ein formally bestowed upon Johnson the almost sacred status of Onon/io.
His final obligation fulfilled, Pontiac sought retirement from the central position that had
proven so costly to his followers as well as himself. But Pontiac's influence over Euro-
Indian affairs was not quite over. 27
The last act of importance ofPontiac in Euro-Indian affairs was found in the
events surrounding his death. Sometime in late 1.768 one ofKask6's loyal chiefs
quarreled with the Ottawa in the woods of the Illinois Territory. Pontiac pulled a knife
and reminded all of the nativists that he still enjoyed considerable status among Indian
peoples despite his desire to reoede into the faceless obscurity of the Illinois forests.
Pontiac stabbed a disagreeable Peoria leader, called Makatachinga or Black Dog, killing
him. The dispute remained a constant source of agitation during the years of conflict
between Pontiac and Kaske, even prompting one French official to remark that "Pondiac
would be killed in less than a year, if the English took so much notice ofhim.,,28 Rumors
--
-
spread ofvengeance awaiting Pontiac when he did not anticipate it. The Peorias
discussed an assassination plot in their council
T
eventually acting upon it. On April 20,
1769 Pontiac was in the town of Cahokia doing some business in a French store. He was
unarmed and alone except for a young Peoria.who accompanied him throughout his
journeys that day. Pontiac had no reason to suspect any malice from his associate, but as
the two left the store the Peoria warrior struck the Ottawa over the head with a club, drew
a knife, then plunged the blade into the chief's side so deep that it killed him almost
instantly. In the wake of the assassination more reprisals resulted, indicating to Pontiac's
continued high esteem amongst many Native tribes. Virtually every nation fonnerly
adhering to Pontiac sang war songs in their councils and the Peorias sought munitions
from the French for their own self-protection?9
Nothing of great consequence materialized in the wake of Pontiac's murder, but
the subtle reverberations spoke to his remaining prestige. Charlot Kaske descended into
great disfavor in the absence of a political rival and stained by the Ottawa chiefs blood
his followers had spilled.. Six Kaskaskias,. who were aHied to the Peorias, were found
dead and sca~ped, the handiwork ofSac and Fox warriors loyal to the slain Ottawa chief.
Symbolically and historically, Pontiac's fame lingered among the many peoples that
comprised his coalition.30 Ultimately, Pontiac was granted a final resting place,
accompanied with full Ottawa and Catholic rites, among the French he claimed as his
brothers. The priest who conducted the funeral, Father Meurin, used a commoners'
cemetery somewhere within the present-day city of St. Louis, Missouri. No further
burials were allowed at the location out of respect for Onontio's Ottawa son, Pontiac. JI
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What r'emains paramount in any discussion ofthis time or region in North
America are perceptions. Historians often do not care to admit that what people perceive
to be true shapes their actions, which in turn shapes larger events. This point is
particularly salient in diplomatic activities across cultures. At the close of the Seven
Years' War, England was struggling to expand i,ts empire in the New WorM while France
was merely trying to salvage whatever remained of its colonial assets. But what each
European power realized was that the real concern d.ictating their aspirations and
subsequent policies was the original owners of the land they coveted. There were no easy
solutions. Despite their best efforts to marginalize Native concerns and manipulate the
customs of those tribes in the critical Great Lakes region, Indian culture thrived
especially when mastered by an Okama adept at the diplomatic rituals ofEuropeans. Just
as French and British social realities receive proper consideration within historical
debates, historians are remiss in ignoring the realities of Indian societies that are also a
part of the diplomatic shadowplay. It cannot be denied, for a period of time in America's
history that in every correspondence, on every set oHips, one name became a part of
every language in the early Northwest: Pontiac. And just as it was in the writings of
white officials in the eighteenth century, the writings ofwhite historians of the twentieth
century find the name ofPontiac incessantly repeating itself For scholars who refuse to
admit the centrality the name Pontiac in the historiography of early westward expansion,
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